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The Comfort Women System: Sexual Slavery during World War II	
 
One can learn from reading a book or attending a lecture, but the lesson becomes real 
when you experience it. This is what Lee Oksun experienced as she shared her story. Lee and I 
are at the House of Sharing located in Gwangju, Geyonggi-do Province, outside Seoul, South 
Korea. The House, also known as Nanum House, is as a safe haven, providing surviving Korean 
comfort women (ianfu) with security, safety, and shelter. Lee explains, “People always talk 
about comfort women not knowing what it truly means. People have to understand where the 
term comes from and what it denotes. To be a ‘comfort women’ means ‘to die’” (Lee 2016).  
Born in 1927, Lee lived in a small, rural Korean village till the age of fifteen when she 
was kidnapped by two unknown men. Lee says, “I went to the comfort station [ianjo], and I 
came back defeated. . . I came back useless.” She lifts her arm to show me the scars that never 
properly healed. “This is a knife wound,” Lee continues and recounts, “I tried to run away [from 
the comfort station] but failed. I was dragged back to the station, and the soldier asked me why I 
ran away. I told him ‘I am done. I’m hungry and cold and I want to leave.’ The soldier then used 
a knife to cut my feet so I could no longer run away” (Lee 2016). Lee points to her feet, 
displaying more scars. 
In many ways, this Honors thesis is a testament to ianfu and their experiences. Comfort 
women, in the wake of their international movement for justice, have become symbols of 
resilience, strength, and courage. By telling their stories of sexual violence and everlasting 
suffering, ianfi have readdressed and redefined crimes against humanity and violence against 
women in times of war and armed conflict.  
In hopes of creating a thesis worthy of the comfort women and their legacies, I first 
describe a culture and environment that gave rise to the comfort system during World War II. 
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Though this is, in no way, a justification for the sexual enslavement of women, it does, to an 
extent, explain how and why such an institution was created. After doing so, I then continue to 
define and describe ianjo and ianfu. Comfort women stations were systematic and methodical. 
More than an isolated incident, there was a method and a plan in which ianfu were abused, raped, 
and, in some cases, murdered. The third large segment is about human rights and international 
law. It is important to note that, though the comfort women system ended in 1945, the Imperial 
Army’s system of sex slavery was not defined a crime against humanity till decades later. The 
United Nations commissioned a report in 1996. I conclude this thesis with a focus on the 
ongoing comfort women case in light of international law.  
After World War II, the global world was in shambles. Despite the international 
community’s weak attempts in investigating crimes and restoring justice, major offences were 
ignored, war victims pushed aside, and the guilty freed. For decades, the Japanese Government 
denied its crimes, holding onto its innocence. It kept secret the coercing and kidnapping of 
countless women into sex camps (Pike 2011: 89, 90). To this day, the Government of Japan and 
its conservative politicians attempt to refute the comfort women case. They maintain that they 
have no legal responsibilities to Korea or its comfort women. As such, the ianfu issue is not one 
of the past, as it remains topical and relevant.  Horrific as it may be, violence against women 
during times of war and conflict are not uncommon.  
The current Japanese Government may label ianfu as volunteer prostitutes. The 
Government might claim comfort women to have been volunteers who chose to serve the 
Imperial Government and Army in World War II. However, surviving comfort women, may 
define themselves as former sex slaves. Girls and young women, mostly from Asia, were coerced 
and forced to sexually oblige Imperial soldiers in foreign territories, like “Japan, China, the 
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Philippines, Indonesia, the then Malaya, Thailand, the then Burma, the then New Guinea, Hong 
Kong, Macao and the then French Indo-China” (Coomaraswamy 1996: 29).  
My own understanding of the comfort women case, having researched and personally 
interacted with surviving Korean ianfu, is that this is an issue of coercive human trafficking, 
wartime rape, and victim silencing. The ianfu issue is, without a doubt, a gross human rights 
violation and crime against humanity; however, what is even more heartbreaking than reading 
ianfu testimonies is knowing these survivors have been and continue to be silenced by the 
Government of Japan. Surviving ianfu, now in their nineties, have said their dying wishes are to 
receive a formal apology but know this will not happen in their lifetime. 
In 1996, the United Nations defined ianjo as a system of “forced prostitution and sexual 
subjugation and abuse in wartime” (Coomaraswamy 1996: 4). The term ianfu is an inappropriate 
euphemism that “does not in the least reflect the suffering, such as multiple rapes on an everyday 
basis and severe physical abuse” (Coomaraswamy 1996: 4). The Special Rapporteur, Ms. 
Radhika Coomaraswamy, explains this case “should be considered a clear case of sexual slavery 
and a slavery-like practice in accordance with the approach adopted by relevant international 
human rights bodies and mechanisms” (Coomaraswamy 1996: 4).  
Kim Hak-sun: The First to Testify 
Kim Hak-sun, a Korean comfort woman, was the first to force Japan to finally acknowledge 
its past. The day before the Korean Independence Day in 1991, Kim, at the age of sixty-seven, 
revealed herself as a former ianfu. From this moment on, Kim and other survivors have been 
rewriting the history of wartime rape and crimes against women.  
Kim was born in 1924. Her birth father died when she was still an infant, leaving her 
mother to remarry. Unable to adjust to her stepfather and new family, Kim was enrolled in a 
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Korean geisha house at the age of fifteen. She attended for two years until her stepfather 
relocated her to Beijing, China where she worked as an ianfu. She remained and worked for four 
months till she convinced a Korean man to help her escape. Though she successfully got away 
from the comfort station and safely returned to Korea, Kim suffered the rest of her life. She 
married the man who helped her escape and gave birth to a son and daughter. Her children died 
very young. Her husband, abusive and intolerant, called Kim a “dirty bitch” and other nasty 
insults that “stabbed her in the heart” (Park 2014). She stayed in Korea, periodically relocating 
and working various jobs as a concubine or housekeeper till the early 1980s.  
During this time, Korean Dr. Yoon Jeong-Ok and women’s organizations were trying to 
gain momentum in the ianfu issue. The Government of Japan did not acknowledge the comfort 
women case, Korea failed to be assertive, and no living comfort women had yet come out. Dr. 
Yoon, determined to explain this case as a system of sex slavery, had a two-fold goal: 1) the 
Japanese Government needed to reveal the truth and accept their past wrongs and 2) the Korean 
Government, rather than being passive, needed to address the injustice. It was then when Kim 
offered to share her testimony. No longer wanting to tolerate Japanese lies, Kim reasoned, “I’m 
on my own and have nothing to lose. I believe that God kept me alive through these years . . . to 
give me this job” (Park 2014).  
Kim delivered her first public testimony in the Tokyo District Court (1991) and it goes as 
follows: Kim was forced into prostitution by the Japanese Imperial Army in northern China. She 
was stripped of her Korean identity, given a Japanese name, Aiko, and “forced to have sexual 
intercourse with Japanese soldiers, as many as 20-30 times a day” (Pike 2011: 90; Korean 
Victims of the Asia-Pacific War). At the Court, Kim and the two other survivors demanded an 
official apology, a thorough investigation of their cases, compensatory payment to survivors 
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($154, 000), the revision of Japanese textbooks, and a memorial museum (Korean Victims of the 
Asia-Pacific War). While the Japanese Government maintained their innocence and refused 
responsibility, Kim and her story shocked the world. 
Kim passed away in 1997, age of seventy-three, with a message: “You should absolutely 
know this [the truth]. It happened before in the past, and it should never, ever happen again” 
(Park 2014). Kim may not have been able to receive the recognition and apology she demanded, 
but her actions were a great catalyst in the ongoing comfort women phenomenon. It was she who 
initiated a movement that inspired Lee Oksun and others to continue the fight. Though the 
conflict still continues, these women have changed the face of international law. 
For this thesis, I spent summer 2016 in South Korea, researching and meeting survivors. I 
chose South Korea for three main reasons. First, I, as a Korean American, am fluent in Korean 
and understand the country’s culture. Traveling to South Korea and meeting with Korean 
survivors were things I could realistically accomplish. Second, the majority of the comfort 
women were Korean. Third, Korean survivors and activists are prominent contributors to and 
figures leading in the unending comfort women case. As such, it should be noted that this 
particular analysis of comfort women will focus on Korean women. Despite the focus on Korea 
and Korean women, it is important to remind readers that all comfort women should be 
remembered when considering the content of this assessment. 
Marked with testimonies from surviving women, international support for the victims, 
and a desire to condemn Japan of its past wrongs, the comfort women case, in light of 
international law, has been a special one (Malekian 2011: 6). Towards the end of my visit at 
Nanum House, Lee concludes, “Think about it: we didn’t survive because we wanted to. We just 
did. This [the comfort women system] was a mass execution of women. And now we hope Korea 
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and the people’s support will help resolve the ongoing conflicts with the Japanese government” 
(Lee 2016). Decades after the War, Lee and many others tell the story of their past and their 
journey towards justice and peace.  
Japanese History and Culture 
The comfort women system cannot be fully understood without first reviewing Japanese 
history and sex culture. According to Cynthia Enloe (2000), prostitution may be one of the oldest 
professions; however, Sarah Soh (2008) rejects this assertion (Enloe 2000; Soh 2008). Soh 
claims pimping, “‘the living off of the earnings of a prostitute,’ to be the oldest profession across 
the globe” (Soh 2008, 109). She supports this with various examples. In ancient Babylonia, a 
class of women was reserved to the temples to help “civilize the wild man”; in medieval Europe, 
some “cities maintained public houses of prostitution for the benefit of young unmarried men”; 
sometimes, the government even subsidized such facilities by making them “legally free and 
socially eligible for marriage” (Soh 2008, 109). Similar practices are evident in Imperial Japan’s 
history and prostitution culture.  
Historically, Japanese culture in not unfamiliar with prostitution as a system of 
entertainment and business. In Kyoto, Japan (1589), warlord Toyotimi Hideyoshi sought a 
pleasure facility to serve his soldiers who were away from families and wives. The facility in 
Kyoto was only a forerunner of what was to become future “pleasure quarters.” This eventually 
resulted with the Yoshiwara (1617), “the first pleasure quarters in Edo (today’s Tokyo),” being 
granted an official government license of business (Soh 2008: 110). Japanese men would enter 
these facilitates, or brothels, basically looking for the company of Japanese women. Soon, as the 
industry started to flourish, there were “hundreds of thousands . . . employed in all corners of 
Japan” and “virtually every adult in Japan had ‘encountered a woman who worked, had worked, 
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or would someday work in the sex trade” at the time (Wang 2012). Licensed prostitution was a 
“commercial system composed of state-regulated ‘pleasure quarters’ in delimited districts where 
prostitutes’ bodies were confined” (Soh 2008: 109). Japan, as suggested in existing literature, 
placed great emphasis on women’s sex work. 
Sex work often has a negative connotation of being immoral or sinful; however, this was 
not the case in early Japan. Rather, the trade of selling sex had a somewhat positive cultural 
connotation within context. Daughters sold by their families or women working in sexual labor 
were considered the “‘sacrifice’ of a filial daughter to support her family” (Wang 2012; Stanley 
and Sommer 2012). Amy Stanley, author of Selling Women: Prostitution, Markets, and the 
Household in Early Modern Japan, suggests that the status of sacrificial daughter was a “positive 
moral value” (Wang 2012; Stanley and Sommer 2012). Because the roles of dutiful daughter and 
supporting family member were so heavily emphasized, sex work was not looked down upon. It 
did not matter as much if the daughter was defiled or endured “violent abuse from employer or 
clients”; they were achieving their customary role of dutiful daughter and supporting family 
member  (Wang 2012; Stanley and Sommer 2012). However, once women began to gain 
prominence and agency within the community, they quickly lost their “sacrificial” aura. In a 
traditionally patriarchal society such as Imperial Japan, this was unacceptable.  
According to Stanley, this shift from support to shaming does not really have to do with 
with the act of selling sex. It has more to do with doing work that causes a rift in the male-
controlled society. She says, “[Japanese prostitutes] were working at an increasing distance 
outside the patriarchal household” and were consequently deemed “materialistic and self-
centered” (Wang 2012; Stanley and Sommer 2012). They were rejected with a societal backlash 
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simply because they defied “the ideal gender order, replacing the logic of the household with the 
logic of market” (Wang 2012). The image of filial daughter soon faded from view. 
Imperial Japan’s “Pleasure Quarters” 
Japanese “pleasure quarters” were essentially designated spaces for heterosexual, 
commercial sex. The women worked within and the men would come and go; however, the 
women in this industry became the victims of their work, not because they were prostitutes, but 
because they were manipulated and controlled by society. Soh continues her analysis that 
pleasure quarter workers were “virtual prisoners” sold by their penniless parents as a means of 
earning income (Soh 2008: 109, 110). Because sex work was a lucrative industry and a profitable 
source of tax revenue, government workers and public officials “almost always turned a blind 
eye” to prostitution, and in doing so, stripped its women of their basic human rights (Wang 
2012). 
The “pleasure quarters” acted as independent cities with their own set of instructions, 
rituals, and guides (Jenkins and Katsumoto 1994). A guidebook for the Yoshiwara and other 
“pleasure quarters” had the following instructions: 
“The basic fee (which doubled on festival days) [for high-ranking courtesans] ranged 
from the equivalent of $450 to $750 in 1993 American money, and this included none of 
the tips that had to be paid to the hikitejaya [tea house], the entertainers, and the 
courtesan’s attendants. . . . [Lower-ranking courtesans] . . . had to sit on public display in 
a custom known as harimise. . . . [They sat] behind their cage-like windows on full view 
to passersby” (Jenkins and Katsumoto 1994: 18). 
 
These were the rules and fees for American visitors. In response, Donald Jenkins, co-author of 
The Floating World Revisited (1994) and art curator for the Portland Art Museum suggests that 
the living conditions of these prostitutes were “not excessively harsh by the standards of the 
time” (18). This, however, is a weak, if not faulty assessment. Jenkins suggests that though the 
work was “harsh”, it was not excessively so. For the “standards of the time”, the women did not 
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suffer as much as they could have. The implications of Jenkins’ observation places the women’s 
sex work on a scale of bad to worse. Is it fair to place a degree or value on the suffering of these 
women? One could argue that it is not. Samurais entering the “pleasure quarters” were asked to 
leave swords and daggers with the attendants outside before entering the building. This was done 
so out of fear that prostitutes, if given access to weapons, would end their own lives to 
permanently escape the “pleasure quarters” (Longstreet and Longstreet 1970: 15). It seems these 
working conditions were borderline unbearable. Still, the international fame of Japan’s “pleasure 
quarters” grew and grew. 
 Japan experienced a period of economic, political, and social turmoil during the 1850s 
and 1860s. As Western forces strengthened, Japan was strong-armed into signing treaty 
agreements with the U.S., Britain, Russia, and the Netherlands. Such agreements achieved two 
objectives. First, foreign traders were now allowed to settle around the Yokohama harbor in large 
numbers, overpowering Japanese traders. Second, additional “pleasure quarters” were to be 
established for foreigner-use only. American men accused of raping Japanese women hoped that 
this ward off anti-foreign sentiment among Japanese (Soh 2008: 110).  By 1868, this came to 
fruition and a red-light district was created within the confines of Tokyo. The new “pleasure 
quarters” constructed in this same year consisted of 130 brothels with 1,724 prostitutes, 92 
brothel geisha, and 109 independent geishas. The Yoshiwara was the first of its kind, but by the 
twentieth century, it was only one of six in the area of Tokyo (Longstreet and Longstreet 1970: 
19).  
 The meaning of “sex work” in Japan is a condition of its specific time and place during 
the years leading up to World War II. To refer back to Enloe and Soh’s comparison of 
prostitution vs. pimping, Japanese sex culture and “pleasure quarters” are, to an extent, a product 
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of Government pimping. Some may argue that the women who left their poor, patriarchal homes 
to better support their families from afar is an indication of “self-determination by achieving 
potential freedom from the confines of family” (Wang 2012).  Even if this is true for some 
women, the patriarchal standards of the former Imperial State created the conditions that 
encouraged women into sex work. It is important to note that there is no shame or dishonor in 
sex work. But the abuse and exploitation endured by these women during this period is 
unacceptable.  
Japanese Colonialism  
 The ianfu issue is, by in large, a product of Japanese sex culture and colonialism. Though 
the culture and colonialism are not to blame individually, together, they provided the foundations 
of sex slavery. 
The Meiji State (1868-1912) 
The Meiji State further modernized the Japanese prostitution system and introduced it to Korea. 
With the decline of the Shogunate Era, the Meiji State was marked with a reinforced imperial 
rule and an adoption of European practices and laws. The prostitution industry, likewise, 
underwent a slight evolution. Soh describes three overall changes. First, there was a greater 
emphasis on the prevention of venereal diseases. Prostitutes were required, by law, to undergo 
mandatory disease examinations at “prostitute hospitals” (Soh 2008: 111). This was a 
responsibility placed solely on women as they were the only ones required to medical checkups. 
Perhaps a more pro-active method of preventing diseases would have been to ask both men and 
women to remain safe and disease-free, but this was not the policy. Soh infers only women were 
blamed for contracting venereal diseases, as men were not exposed to medical checkups. Second, 
the Government of Japan enforced a monthly tax on brothel owners and prostitutes. Third, 
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unlicensed prostitution was deemed unlawful and effectively criminalized (Soh 2008: 111). 
Japanese historian Fujime Yuki (1997) explains this evolution “as an attempt to monopolize the 
traffic in women for sex” (Yuki 1997: 141; Soh 2008: 111). The second and third changes 
indicate the Government was involved in facilitating the commercialization of women and sex. 
The only way to legally and effectively operate sex work was through the Government. Japan’s 
prostitution industry was not an independent business, and the Government is largely responsible 
for the movement of women’s bodies for sex needs.  
 Despite such malpractices, there was very little concern for human rights violations. In 
1872, The Maria Luz, a Peruvian ship, entered the Yokohama harbor to rest and repair. Onboard 
were 231 Chinese, nineteen of whom were children, being transported from Macao to Peru. So 
disastrous were the conditions on the ship that a man “who had been deceptively recruited by 
traffickers in the ‘coolie trade’” jumped into the water in a cry for help. Rescued by an English 
battleship crew, the man begged the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to seek mistreatment 
intervention and filed a civil suit. An English lawyer representing the man who jumped ship 
argued “that if the Chinese laborers were to be regarded as slaves from a humanitarian 
perspective, the tens of thousands of women trafficked as prostitutes in Japan were in fact slaves, 
too” (Soh 2008: 112).  The lawyer’s testament may have been unexpected at the time, but now, it 
is clear he was not wrong. Now, as evident in the 1996 United Nations’ ianfu commission, 
women trafficked for the purpose of sexual servitude is a crime against humanity and a form of 
sexual slavery. But this was already evident fifty-one years before the formal the formal United 
Nations protocol was passed. Despite the lax human rights laws and protocols, the Japanese 
Government and judge overseeing the ruling had no choice but to agree and emancipate the 
prostitutes. Japan informed China to come retrieve its people (Soh 2008: 112). 
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 About a month after the incident, the Japanese Government created Ordinance No. 295, 
also known as the Prostitutes’ Liberation Law. This Ordinance was only a farce and an attempt 
to save face whilst maintaining the Japan’s prostitution system. The Government had no 
intention of getting rid of the “pleasure quarters” or even the red-light districts. The women 
onboard the Maria Luz who were emancipated back to China were unfortunately unable to find 
other means of support. Many of them had no choice but to return to the “pleasure quarters” or 
other similar work to stay afloat  (Soh 2008: 112). 
 Within Japan, the State worked hard to create a “Pure Japan” that incorporated the 
pleasures of systematic sex without legal obstacles and limitations. Outside Japan, however, the 
Meiji State further entrenched its Imperial rule, particularly in Korea (1868). As Japan grew 
stronger and continued to militarize during the nineteenth century, military bases and camps 
sprouted throughout the country and outer territories. If a military base was established, a 
government-organized brothel was soon to follow. One did not come without the other (Soh 
2008: 113–4). This, to an extent, describes the Japanese prostitution culture which, as will be 
explained in the sections to come, eventually gave rise to Imperial Japan’s comfort women 
system. Many of these same practices used in “pleasure quarters” and red-light districts were 
adapted during World War II.  
The Introduction of Prostitution in Korea 
Korea, by influence of colonialism, slowly adopted the Japanese prostitution culture. This 
is important to note as it allowed for the eventual trafficking of Korean women to Japanese 
territories and ianjo. Without this introduction and adaption, it remains unlikely Korean women 
would have created the bulk of the ianfu population. 
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Korea’s first introduction to a modern system of licensed prostitution started with Japan’s 
Kwanga Treaty (1876). Following the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War (1894-
1895 and 1904-1905 respectively), there was a growing Japanese military presence in Korea. To 
accommodate Japanese soldiers abroad, “pleasure quarters” were established. This started in 
Pusan, Korea and eventually spread to port cities, like Inchon, Wonsan, and Chinnamp’o, Korea. 
In the years leading up to Korea’s annexation (1910), there were almost 3,000 Japanese women 
in Korea working as “overseas prostitutes” (Soh 2008: 8). It should be clarified that this 
institutionalization of prostitution began with Japanese women working abroad in Korea. It was 
not till later that Korean women also joined this work force. The strong Japan grew, the more 
dependent Koreans were on Japanese institutions generally, and this included sex work. 
Japan’s stronghold on Korea amplified in the decades following the Meiji State. The 
Japan-Korea Treaty (1905) ultimately did away with Korea’s sovereignty, forcing Korea to 
“consult” Japan in areas of finance and foreign affairs. As a result, Korea was “completely 
deprived of its diplomatic power and autonomy in internal affairs” (Tanaka 2002: 34). By 1910, 
the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty officially declared Korea as a colony of Japan, and Korea’s 
economy drastically worsened. Korea’s traditional land ownership system was dismantled 
leaving many Korean peasants and farmers homeless. Much of Korea’s rice production was 
exported to Japan, cutting local rice consumption. Consequently, unemployment rates soared to 
85% in the 1930s.  
This had a snowballing impact on Korea’s prostitution culture. Not only did more and 
more Koreans relocate to Japan in hopes of finding work as indentured laborers, but also Korea’s 
newly budding prostitution industry blossomed (Tanaka 2002: 34–5). There was a swift increase 
in the number of Korean sex workers in Korea. In 1910, there were 1,193 prostitutes; by 1915, 
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there were 1,768l. This is roughly a 50 percent growth. The number of Japanese prostitutes in 
Korea also increased somewhat but only by less than 20 percent (from 4,091 to 4,680) (Soh 
2008: 9). Koreans became heavily reliant on Japanese industries for survival. Young women, as 
a result, had no choice but to “[pick] up odd jobs to support their peasant families” (Tanaka 
2002: 35). Most worked as low-paid factory workers, waitresses, prostitutes, and housemaids for 
Japanese families. Prostitution was an especially popular form of employment at the time. 
According to a 1927 article in Dongah Ilbo, a Korean newspaper, “many young women were 
sold to brothels in return for an advance payment to their families. Many married women also 
became prostitutes due to financial difficulties that arose while their husbands were working 
away from home” (Tanaka 2002: 35; Song 1997). While some women may have chosen to work 
in this industry, others were sold. It is difficult to assert either that all women worked voluntarily 
or that all women were constrained against their will.  
In order to accommodate the growing prostitution industry, even unassuming yet 
apparently legitimate businesses operated underground prostitution rings. Restaurants, cafés, bars 
“operated clandestine prostitution businesses” by paying Korean women for their “waitress[ing]” 
and “barmaid” services (Tanaka 2002: 36). For example, restaurants-cum-brothels, owned by 
Japanese businessmen, was a booming commerce. By advertising “second-class geigi” work, 
many unassuming Korean women were tricked. Geigi, a synonym for geisha, gave women the 
impression that they, too, would be doing the work of an entry-level geisha, not as an outright 
prostitute (Soh 2008: 8). Soh suggests defining the sex work as such was not necessarily 
unintentional. The implication was that if women knew the kind of sex work this involved, they 
would be less willing to participate. Thus, by manipulating the situation, more women were 
inclined to work, and by then, it was too late to quit. It was not uncommon to witness “scenes of 
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tearful, angry Japanese recruits fighting their deceitful recruiters” during this time (Soh 2008: 8). 
Considering the coercion and manipulation, one must critically question whether or not “second-
class geigi” work classified as prostitution. It could be argued not, as these women were not 
consenting participants. 
However, this was of very little relevance to the colonizers. As long as the industry 
continued to thrive and there was a constant supply of women, the Japanese Government cared 
little. As the prostitution industry gained prominence, Japan further entrenched the business in 
Korea. From 1916 to 1922, the Government of Japan enacted a series of laws regulating 
prostitute employment agencies that allowed brothel owners and “employment agents” to operate 
under police protection. Now, if women were coerced or manipulated into sex work, there was 
no one to complain to. The corruption was official policy. Those who were more willing to 
collaborate and cooperate with Japanese administrations, even if this meant exploiting Korean 
women, were more likely to gain licensing approval and bypass regulation laws (Tanaka 2002: 
36). Police could simply look the other way. The Korean prostitution system was a tool of 
exploitation used by the Japanese. 
Fewer regulations meant greater business opportunities, and the industry continued to 
grow. As of the mid-1920s, there were about 5,000 to 6,000 “employment agents” in Seoul 
alone. It is estimated that 30,000 women were sold annually for prices ranging from 50 to 1,200 
yen (Tanaka 2002: 36–7; Song 1997: 182). This total, however, does not include the number of 
women who were “deceived by labor brokers who gave false promises of employment, such as 
factory work, and ended up as prostitutes” (Tanaka 2002: 37; Song 1997: 181–2). Yuki Tanaka, 
author of Japan’s Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery and Prostitution during World War II and the 
US Occupation (2002), explains Korean prostitutes were significantly cheaper than were their 
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Japanese counterparts, and this “pricing mechanism” further sustained Korea’s ongoing and 
worsening poverty (36). For example, in 1933, brothel owners in Inchon, Korea paid between 
200 and 700 yen for a Korean prostitute and between 700 and 2,500 for a Japanese, both on a 
five-year contract. It made more financial sense to employ more Korean women that Japanese. 
Several Korean women essentially had an equivalent monetary value as having one Japanese 
woman (Tanaka 2002: 35-6). Japanese prostitutes were valued while Koreans were not. Korean 
women were basically cheaper goods. 
In short, the Imperial Japan had an officially recognized sex culture. As Japan colonized 
Korea, it introduced this culture and created an industry. It is important to recognize that while 
some women were sold or forced into prostitution, others chose this industry to earn a living. As 
American scholar of Japanese legal studies J. Mark Ramseyer explains, “the women who became 
licensed prostitutes were ‘not with many attractive alternatives’” (Soh 2008: 114). It was the 
best, most viable option for some women at the time.  
Prostitution and commercial may have been legal under the Government of Japan, but it 
was not by no means acceptable. Though the discourse between prostitution for commercial sex 
and sexual slavery is complicated and sensitive, this distinction is crucial. The difference 
between choice and coercion within this context is not a simply binary. Many horrible things 
happened to these women, almost making the need to define “prostitute” vs. “sex slave” 
unnecessary. I do not seek to shame or criticize Japan’s culture or prostitution or commercial 
sex. Rather, the controversy exists because the Government’s involvement in coercing and 
trafficking women’s bodies for profit. The Government may have condoned “pleasure quarters” 
and red-light districts, but there is no validation in abusing, torturing, and raping women. This is 
a violation of human rights. 
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Broader Origins of Comfort Women 
The Japanese comfort system is not the first of its kind and it is unlikely to be the last. 
War does not come naturally to man, but it does create an environment in which soldiers yearn 
for a certain type of human connection. Some scholars, such as Joshua Goldstein of War and 
Gender (2001), suggest that because war is “the most stressful environment possible,” soldiers 
display an “almost universal preoccupation with sex” (Goldstein 2001: 333). Perhaps this can be 
applied to our understanding Imperial Japan’s comfort stations. Throughout history, there have 
been countless cases of wartime sexual violence and rape. It seems that where there is conflict, 
there is also the need for women’s bodies and sexual satisfaction.  
War’s Intimate Connection with Sex 
For example, the Roman Empire (753-27 BC) had an arrangement similar to that of the 
Japanese Imperial Army’s. Founded on a system of slavery, Roman society was structured in a 
way that best served the elites in all aspects of life. Because slavery was connected to conquest 
and war, the Roman Army had a steady supply of slaves and captive women. The Roman version 
of comfort women, for a lack of a better term, essentially provided military men with “sexual 
services at all hours of the day and night, as well as . . . traditionally female chores such as 
nursing, washing, and cooking” (Hicks 1995: 29). Similarly, the Spanish Armada sailed towards 
the Netherlands, it travelled with “400 mounted whores and 800 on foot” (Hicks 1995, 29). 
Decades later, the British military in India, in the nineteenth century, organized bazaars with a 
prostitutes’ quarter where Indian women “performed all the services required” (Hicks 1995, 30). 
The sex quarters used by the German army in World War II were regulated with specific rules: 
“Use a condom—danger of venereal disease,” “Memorise your partner’s registration number,” 
“Disinfect after intercourse!” (Hicks 1995, 32). Not much was different during World War II 
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where “sex [also] flourished” (Goldstein 2001: 337). Apparently, war and military camps are not 
complete without some sort of organized sex camp.  
The most commonly given explanation for war’s intimate connection with sex is that 
soldiers need an outlet to help control their emotions and distract them from the dangers of war 
(Goldstein 2001: 333). In an attempt to maintain soldiers’ morale, military commanders would 
sometimes encourage, even initiate, army prostitution services. Perhaps this is why the Roman 
Empire, the Spanish Armada, British military, Germany army, and Japanese Imperial Army had 
their own organizations for convenient sex.  
Both men and women are tools used of their governments during war and conflict. 
Whereas men are those typically fighting, women are behind the lines serving the men. But the 
wartime woman is also the wartime man’s tool. Men also use women as a means of humiliating, 
defeating, and emasculating other, enemy men. Goldstein says the following to explicate 
wartime rape:  
A raped woman ‘is devalued property, and she signals defeat for the man who fails in his 
role as protector.’ Rape is thus “a means of establishing jurisdiction and conquest.’ ‘Rape 
at once pollutes and occupies the territory of the nation, transgresses its boundaries, 
defeats its protectors.’ For its victims, rape as a ‘violent invasion into the interior of one’s 
body represents the most severe attack imaginable upon the intimate self and the dignity 
of a human being,’ constituting ‘severe torture’ (Goldstein 2001: 362). 
 
Rape during conflict represents not just male domination of women, but it is also of male 
domination over other men. When men fail in their patriarchal role of guarding and defending 
the community and their women, this is rationalized as a sign of weakness. It is an indirect 
conquest of men. Perhaps this is what the Rape of Nanking, soon to be explained, symbolized for 
the Japanese soldiers and Government. Japan was asserting its dominance over its colonies, like 
China and Korea.  
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The Rape of Nanking (1937): The Moment that Gave Way to Comfort Stations  
In 1931, Imperial Japanese forces entered Manchuria. As the Army moved through China 
and the rest of Southeast Asia, it established comfort stations for no greater reason that to 
“comfort the brave Japanese soldiers fighting for the empire abroad” (Fisher 2015). Though 
these quarters and red-light districts may not be the same as the comfort system used in World 
War II, their core tendencies remained similar. The ianfu system was a part of official 
Government policies and laws as introduced during the “pleasure quarters” time period.  
However, as Japan’s Central China Area Army expanded through China and to Nanking, 
its soldiers also desecrated the local community with acts of “looting, massacre, arson, [and] 
rape” for a six-week period (Tanaka 2002: 13). Infamously known as the Rape of Nanking, the 
Japanese Army slaughtered around 200,000 Chinese. Such actions were met with outrage from 
both China and the international community as images and reports of Japan’s crimes surfaced. In 
an attempt to prevent future such conflicts and avoid further hate, the Government of Japan 
devised a plan (Lai 2002: 34). The solution, though it was anything but, was to create a system of 
easy and “legal” sex. If soldiers were given a sexual outlet, then maybe they would be less likely 
to rape local women, at least not publically. Japan could keep their reputation intact. The Rape of 
Nanking is credited as the moment that gave origin to ianjo. 
Lieutenant-General Okabe-Naozaburo rationalizes,  
. . . the reason for such strong anti-Japanese sentiment [among the local Chinese 
population] is widespread rape committed by Japanese military personnel in many places. 
It is said that such rape is fermenting unexpectedly serious anti-Japanese sentiment . . . 
Therefore, frequent occurrence of rape in various places is not just a matter of criminal 
law. It is nothing but high treason that breaches public peace and order, that harms the 
strategic activities of our entire forces, and that brings serious trouble to our nation 
(Tanaka 2002: 16). 
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Japanese forces ransacked Nanking and raped hundreds of Chinese women, but Lieutenant-
General Okabe did not “expect” Chinese locals to resent Japanese soldiers. He could not 
understand the implications of this human rights violation. Okabe goes on to explain comfort 
stations will be established “to prevent our [Japanese] men from inadvertently breaking the law 
due to the lack of such facilities” (Tanaka 2002: 16). Though Okabe is convinced rape is a crime 
deserving of punishment, he does so only because it hinders Japan’s goals of expansion. Rape as 
part of a system of business or military provisioning does not strike him as rape. 
Goldstein suggests, similar to what happened in the Bosnian War, the Rape of Nanking 
and the ianfu case are historical events of “[s]ystematic mass rape during conquest” (Goldstein 
2001: 363). Without understanding the complexities of prostitution and rape during war, it is 
impossible to truly understand what Lee Oksun meant what she said at the beginning of the 
paper: “To be an ‘comfort women’ means ‘to die.’. . . [The comfort women system] was a mass 
execution of women.” Now this makes clearer sense. To be an ianfu essentially translates into 
“[having] sex with as many as thirty men per day, working in stations of about fifteen women” in 
a “large-scale, officially organized system of rape by the Imperial Japanese Forces” (Goldstein 
2001: 346). One must wonder why the definition of the comfort women case as wartime rape is 
contested when other, similar incidences, such as the Rape of Nanking and Bosnian War, are not. 
Though comfort stations have been described as brothels in other literatures, that 
description is inadequate. These camps were a part of a greater organization mandated by the 
Japanese military to imprison non-Japanese women and girls for the purpose of non-consensual 
sexual satisfaction. Within the comfort women paradigm, the pimp was the Japanese State and it 
preyed on young women for military sex slaves.   
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Imperial Japan’s Curiosity with Comfort Women 
This current section goes a little further to explore Imperial Japan’s curiosity with 
comfort women. Japan’s rationale can be explained in three claims. First, as Japan continued to 
expand and adopt new territories, the frequency of rapes committed against local women by 
Japanese soldiers rose. When soldiers “plundered towns, raped women, started fires and brutally 
killed any captives”, anti-Japanese sentiment worsened among locals, making it difficult to 
maintain any sense of order and power. In an attempt to reduce such tensions, military personnel 
were instructed so that “. . . each soldier’s behaviors must be tightly controlled and sexual 
comfort facilities should be set up” (Chung 1995: 44). This was already illustrated in Okabe’s 
statement above. 
Second, by restricting the sexual acts of soldiers to camps and specified women, sexually 
transmitted and venereal diseases were kept at bay. When soldiers raped at random, such 
diseases and infections were problematic and difficult to control; however, sex camps made this 
manageable. Dr. Aso Tetsuo, a former military surgeon with a gynecology background, was one 
of the first to observe the medical conditions of the comfort women system. In 1938, Dr. Aso 
examined 100 women working at the “recreation centre” and concluded,  
Those to be examined were 80 women from the Peninsula [a term for Koreans often used 
to avoid reference to nationality] and 20 or so from the Homeland (Japan proper). Among 
those from the Peninsula, there was very little indication indeed of venereal disease, but 
those from the Homeland, although free of acute symptoms at present, were all extremely 
dubious. . . Care needs to be taken with the more jaded type of woman, whom I have 
repeatedly examined for syphilis and found clearly branded with a past history of 
venereal disease by the scars of bubo excisions on the groins. These are really dubious as 
gifts to the Imperial Forces (Hicks 1995: 34). 
 
Dr. Aso’s reflection further indicates how comfort women were viewed and what their 
designated wartime roles were. While those comfort women from Korea (Peninsula) showed few 
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signs of venereal diseases, those from Japan were more likely to be infected. Women who are 
“more jaded” need more care as they are evidently forgetful or careless. It is inappropriate to 
present the Imperial Forces with “dubious gifts.” 
Third, as presented in official military documents, the most direct purpose of having sex 
slaves was “to encourage the spirit[s] of the soldiers” (Chung 1995: 14). The longer the War 
continued, the more it seemed Japanese soldiers were losing energy and faith in the fight. Their 
psychological states worsened, making it difficult to effectively and efficiently maintain 
occupied territory and further expand sovereignty. It was assumed that sexual deprivation was 
particularly harmful in making one more accident-prone. Sex, as a result, was the recreational 
activity known to relieve stress and counteract the deleterious effects of war (Chung 1995: 14; 
Hicks 1995: 32–3). Author of The Emperor’s Forces and Korean Comfort Women, Kim Il 
Myon, illustrates this: 
To soldiers in the frontline, ever surrounded by the sounds of guns, wrapped in smoke 
stinking of death and not knowing when death would come . . . a visit to the comfort 
station was no doubt the only form of relief. It was the only kind of individual act in 
which one was ‘liberated.’ Theirs was a prison-like existence, their eardrums daily 
ringing from blows. The comfort station was where they were at least temporarily 
‘liberated’ from the savagery of the unit. It was their ‘oasis’ (Hicks 1995: 33).  
 
It was believed that the sexual comfort of a woman would relieve stress and tension, 
consequently allowing Japanese men to focus on the important military tasks at hand.  
Evidently, sex within the Japanese Army became a ritual of sorts. It evolved into a rite of 
passage that all men though were entitled to and a superstitious belief that sex before battle 
would keep Japanese soldiers safe from wartime injuries. Good luck charms were even “made 
with pubic hair of comfort women, or from something belonging to them” (Hicks 1995: 32). 
Those who remained “aloof,” or virgins, were considered odd and unusual. In a recorded 
incident, for example, a soldier who had never been to the ianjo was forcibly taken by a fellow 
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comrade “who then watched through holes in the wall” (Hicks 1995: 33). An excerpt from the 
War Ministry summarizes the Japanese rationale:  
. . . care must be taken into [sic] regard to suitable living conditions and comfort 
facilities. In particular the psychological influence received from sexual comfort stations 
is most direct and profound and it must be realised how greatly their appropriate direction 
and supervision affect the raising of morale, the maintenance of discipline and the 
prevention of crime and venereal disease (Hicks 1995: 33). 
 
This was all was done under the pretense of concern psychological health and wellbeing. But 
men are the focus of analysis, and the stresses and hardships of war on women were never 
considered. 
Deceit and Coercion in Comfort Women Recruitment 
The previous section mentions Japan’s rationale for creating ianfu and ianjo. This section 
will complement the ongoing argument and I will show in more depth how and why the comfort 
women system was deceitful and coercive. 
First, to claim that ianfu were volunteer prostitutes for the Imperial Army, but this is 
simply false. These women were deceitfully recruited by the Government of Japan and Army. 
They are victims of human trafficking and rape in a system of sex slavery. Recruitment of ianfu 
focused heavily on Korean communities, and it was a process dependent on not only the 
Japanese State but also outside players, like Korean and Japanese police and local government 
(Hicks 1995: 20; Tanaka 2002: 38).  
The exact number of ianjo and ianfu remains unclear, but the Department of Police 
Affairs in Northern China in July 1939 recorded about 8,931 geishas, prostitutes, and barmaids. 
Presumably, many, if not most, of these women were comfort women. This total most likely also 
does not include all of the comfort women recruited by the Japanese army (Tanaka 2002, 16). 
Major Yamazaki Masao, a staff officer, says more:  
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As [Chinese] women are still afraid [of the Japanese soldiers], not many want to work 
here, and the service is not good enough. However, if we assure them that their lives are 
safe, we pay and appropriate amount of money, and we do not make them work hard, I 
expect women will come to work one after another. The military police are unofficially 
saying that they will recruit 100 . . . (Tanaka 2002, 13).  
 
Women were uncomfortable, but with some money and the illusion of safety and 
protection, they would be convinced otherwise. The concept of “recruitment” may sound 
innocent, but a closer look suggests otherwise. One wonders how they plan to recruit as many as 
100 women under such unfavorable circumstances. This marks the origin of comfort women and 
comfort stations. Though not explicitly affirmed, the journal entry suggests a certain degree of 
coercion and exploitation in the recruitment of women. 
There were two methods to this procedure: 1) recruiting agents were sometimes hired by 
the Army to “secure a specific number of women” or 2) they were “commissioned by . . . brothel 
owners/managers to actually procure women sub-contractor” (Tanaka 2002: 38). In a typical 
scenario, a Japanese or Korean ianjo manager would travel to Korea, somewhere like Pusan or 
Incheon, on business. He would usually stay in a local inn for a few weeks or months, slowly 
recruiting more and more women until he had enough. The recruiter would travel from city to 
city, collecting local Korean women with him. A popular location to enlist women were schools, 
where “many of the victims were children ages fourteen to eighteen—so that the military could 
ensure their virginity” (Fisher 2015; Coomaraswamy 1996).On average, each trip yielded in 
about forty to fifty women. Once enough women were secured, the sub-contractor would return 
to China with the women (Howard 1995; Tanaka 2002: 38). 
 The women were then shipped military bases and occupied lands to serve the Imperial 
Army. Majority of the young women used as comfort women were unassuming and naïve, 
drafted into the system against their wills (Hicks 1995: 20). Though one could argue that comfort 
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women understood the workings of the comfort women system and even “sign[ed] an 
‘agreement,’” there was a sweeping misconception of what this demanded (Hicks 1995: 20). Any 
form of recognition or consent given by the women were arguably meaningless. Many of the 
women were trafficked to the front lines in China and locked in three-by-five barracks to be 
raped up to sixty to seventy times a day (Fisher 2015). No one could have agreed to such 
conditions.  
Furthermore, research conducted by Jong Jingsong (1993) explains the most common 
form of recruiting Korean women, particularly those of poor, peasant families, was through false 
promises and deceit. Jong researched 175 comfort women, and of these women, 105 claim to 
have been recruited from rural areas in Cholla Provinces and Kyongsang, Korea. As these 
women were the easiest to target and manipulate, they were the most popular. A recruiter would 
approach a young Korean woman from a poor family with promise of work, usually “as a factory 
worker, assistant nurse, laundry worker, kitchen helper or the like,” abroad in Japan or Japanese 
territories (Tanaka 2002: 38). Once the woman agreed to the work, she would then stay with the 
recruiter, eating good food and receiving great care and comfort, till their moment of departure. 
During this time, the women would not find out where they were going or what kind of work 
they would be doing until arriving at the comfort station (Jong 1993; Tanaka 2002: 38). It was 
noted in a Japanese military document that “personnel in charge of drafting women must be 
selected with great care to minimize commotion during the process” (Chung 1995: 19).  
Very little known was about ianfu prior to 1991 when Kim Hak-sun and two other 
survivors, who chose to remain anonymous, testified about former Japan’s human rights 
violations. The testimonies of these three survivors provide personal, historical accounts of the 
comfort women system during World War II. Their stories are marked by coercion, forcible 
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detainment, and human trafficking. The first of the three testimonies is Kim’s, as was described 
above. Kim grew up in a poor family, and her parents had no choice but to give their daughter up 
for adoption. At the age of fourteen, Kim’s adopted father, enrolled Kim to a “prostitute training 
school, from which she graduated in 1939 at the age of seventeen” (Sato 2014: 263). Promptly 
after, Kim, by the instructions of her foster father, was transported to China to find a “good job” 
(Sato 2014: 263). Upon arrival, “Kim was locked up in a house and made to serve ten to thirty 
soldiers daily” (Sato 2014: 263). She eventually ran away with a Korean man (Sato 2014: 263).  
Plaintiff A, one of the two anonymous survivors, also shared her story. She lived in 
Pusan, Korea when she was taken to Japan. Plaintiff A left her house to witness the first elevator 
in a Japanese department store. Here, she met two men, one Japanese and the other Korean, who 
convinced her to travel abroad with promises of a new job in a Japanese textile factory. Though 
hesitant, the woman agreed to follow the men. Upon boarding a ship, Plaintiff A, concerned, 
expressed her wish to return home. Plaintiff A was “forcibly detained” and taken to Rabaul 
where she “joined about twenty other women working as ianfu in a church building” (Sato 2014: 
263).  
The second ianfu, Plaintiff B, similar to Plaintiff A, was also lied to with promise of 
work. A Korean man came to her village with news of work abroad. The man bribed the woman 
with thirty or forty yen. She accepted the money, gave it to her mother, and followed the man 
only to be taken to Shanghai where a Japanese soldier drove her and other women to a nearby 
ianjo (Sato 2014: 263). The lawsuit alleged that the “military authorities approved the 
establishment of ianjo” and that “most of the women were deceived into becoming ianfu and 
subsequently forced to provide sexual services to soldiers” (Sato 2014: 262). All three women 
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claim were coerced, lied to, and/or forcibly held against their will. They are victims of human 
trafficking. 
The testimonies of Kim and the two survivors were met with much backlash and rejection 
from the Government of Japan and its conservative word; however, as Jong’s research coincides 
with the stories of Kim, Plaintiff A, and Plaintiff B, this further supports that the comfort women 
system was a deceitful one. There may have been a variety of ways in which women were 
recruited, but each method of recruitment indicates practices of human trafficking. This is best 
explained in four categories: 1) recruitment by violence, including threats of violence and the 
misuse of power, 2) false promises of employment, 3) abduction, 4) human traffic” (Chung 
1995: 19). According to international regulations available during this time, “taking anybody 
through deceit, violence, threat, misuse of power or any other coercive means” is an act of 
“forced drafting,” or human trafficking (Chung 1995: 18).  
It is significant the comfort women were part of an overall system. It matters little if the 
women were recruited by individual agents, the Army, or even the Government. Those involved 
shared the same goal of attracting women to ianjo. Methods and procedures in doing so may 
differ, but this does not suggest some are innocent while others are not. In other words, even if 
the Government did not directly recruit comfort women, it is still just as much at fault as would 
be a recruiter. Though it had yet to be branded a “crime against humanity” at the time, it falls 
nothing short of violation and defiance of basic human rights. 
Who were the Comfort Women? 
 
This following section will describe in more depth who comfort women were and where 
they came from, based on scholar Chin Sung Chung (1995), using the interviews of nineteen 
survivors, provides valuable information. Though it should be noted that the testimonies of these 
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nineteen do not provide a complete depiction of the all women and the comfort system, they do, 
to an extent, provide insight otherwise unknown.  
Due to the lack of surviving comprehensive records, the total number of ianfu remains 
largely speculated, ranging from 20,000 to 410,000. These numbers have been estimated by 
extrapolating the number of soldiers during the War. Existing records suggest each ianfu would 
have served an average of thirty Japanese at any given time and that each ianfu was probably 
replaced and rotated about three times during the entirety of the war for various reasons, 
including escape, illness, maybe death. This suggests there to have been roughly 410,000 
comfort women. Some scholars, however, argue there to have only been 20,000 women on the 
basis that there were about 2.5 million soldiers who had access to ianjo (Sato 2014: 262). Either 
way, Senda Kako, “one of the earliest researchers on military comfort women,” confirms roughly 
90 percent of ianfu were Korean, and ianjo "existed in Japan, China, the Philippines, Indonesia, 
the then Malaya, Thailand, the then Burma, the then New Guinea, Hong Kong, Macao and the 
then French Indo-China" (Coomaraswamy 1996: 29).	These findings, despite their vagueness, 
are supported by official documents, previous interviews, and information revealed by the Seoul-
based Fact Finding Committee for Coercively Drafted Koreans (Chung 1995: 16). 
Moreover, Japanese historian Yoshimi Yoshaiki suggests the Japanese Government 
targeted Korean women for legal reasons. According to the ratified treaties of the time, Japan 
could, if needed, construe the situation so that it was not violating international laws or bans. 
Japan ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of White Slave Traffic (1910) 
and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic of Women and Children 
(1912), but purposely failed to include colonies in the agreements, effectively removing Korea 
and Taiwan (colonies of Japan at the time) from the agreements. Surviving Korean ianjo Park 
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Ok-sun explains this in response: “We were taken to the military brothel by the Japanese military 
mainly because our country, colonized by Japan, was not strong enough to protect us. Therefore, 
this is not our individual problem, but our nation's problem” (Min 2003, 945). Legally speaking, 
Japan was not violating international law. Having effectively created a loophole, the Japanese 
government was deceitfully authorized to traffic young Korean and Taiwanese women for sexual 
slavery. 
While the legal age for prostitution in Japan was 18 and in Korea 17, such rules were 
ignored for comfort women. There simply were no age restrictions. One of the nineteen women 
interviewed by Chung was only 11 when she was taken to Taiwan. Though she spent the first 
four years running errands for the comfort stations till she was 15 years of age, she still lived and 
worked in a sex camp. A second woman was 13 when she was taken to a fabric factory in Tokyo. 
She worked here for two years until she relocated to a comfort station in Osaka, Japan. Chung 
continues that of the nineteen interviewed, ‘one was 11 when taken, one 14, two 15, five 16, four 
17, two 18, two 19, one 21, and one 22” (1995: 17-8).  
Most of the ianfu were the daughters of poor families. They also usually had very little 
education. Four of the nineteen had no history of education, four had attended night school, ten 
received elementary school-level learning, and one was still attending secondary school when 
taken from home Furthermore, only one of the nineteen was married (Chung 1995: 18). 
As sex workers, the women had a strict set of rules and fees. While the ratings differed 
for officers based on rank and commission, Korean women typically served soldiers of lower 
rank and file. The Japanese women were reserved for officers. In one particular station in 1942, 
those of lower rank and file were charged 1 yen/30 minutes and 2 yen/one hours while non-
commissioned officers were charged 1.5 and 2.5 yen respectively. Officers, on the other hand, 
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were charged 3 yen and 4 yen. To stay overnight cost 8 yen. Despite this, comfort women were 
not always paid for their services. Only three of the nineteen women interviewed say they were 
paid with money or tickets. Seven women remember they were forced to give their earnings to 
the comfort station manager. Only one comfort woman was able to collect enough savings to 
mail home to her family. It should also be noted that while Korean women were less expensive 
than were Japanese. Chinese women were the cheapest (Chung 1995: 21). 
According to the testimony of former soldiers, there would be between twenty to thirty 
soldiers waiting for their turn with comfort women. While soldiers were given visitations of 
thirty minutes or one hour, most men only needed a few minutes. In extreme cases, comfort 
women remember “serv[ing] 100 men in a single day” (Chung 1995: 21). Weekends were an 
especially popular time. Fees also varied according to rank and visiting hours.  
Comfort women were also required to undergo medical examinations to prevent 
unwanted pregnancies and the spread of venereal diseases. Soldiers were sometimes requested to 
use condoms. Should a soldier refuse, comfort women were instructed to report this to 
proprietors. A common rule was to reuse a condom five times before discarding it. In some 
instances, women were asked to reuse condoms by washing them again and again. If injected or 
diseased, women were treated with an injection known as No. 606. Sometimes they would be 
given several days’ rest, but other times, ianfu were required to serve while still ill. Medical 
examinations ensured venereal diseases were kept at bay, but ianfu doctors neglected other pains 
and discomforts. Comfort women reportedly also suffered from malaria, jaundice, mental 
disorders, and/or vaginal swelling. In the case of a pregnancy, women were given abortions or 
instructed to give the children to an orphanage (Chung 1995: 22–3).  
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The experiences of three Korean ianfu, Kum Ju Hwang, Chong Ok Sun, and Hwang So 
Gyun, help readers better understand ianjo practices and medical requirements. Kum tells her 
story beginning with the moment of recruitnment to her time as a comfort women. Seventy-three 
years old at the time of her testimony, Kum illustrates: 
 I thought I was drafted as a labour worker when, at the age of 17, the Japanese village 
leader’s wife ordered all unmarried Korean girls to go to work at a Japanese military 
factory.  I worked there for three years, until the day that I was asked to follow a Japanese 
soldier into his tent. He told me to take my clothes off. I resisted because I was so scared, 
I was still a virgin. But he just ripped my skirt and cut my underwear from my body with 
a gun which had a knife attached to it.  At that point I fainted.  And when I woke up 
again, I was covered with a blanket but there was blood everywhere. 
 From then on, I realized that during the first year I, like all the other Korean girls with 
me, was ordered to service high-ranking officials, and as time passed, and as we were 
more and more “used,” we served lower-ranking officers.  If a woman got a disease, she 
usually vanished. We were also given “606-shots” so that we would not get pregnant or 
that any pregnancies would result in miscarriage. 
 We only received clothes two times per year and not enough food, only rice cakes and 
water.  I was never paid for my “services,”  I worked for five years as a “comfort 
woman,” but all my life I suffered from it. My intestines are mostly removed because 
they were infected so many times, I have not been able to have intercourse because of the 
painful and shameful experiences. I cannot drink milk or fruit juices without feeling sick 
because it reminds me too much of those dirty things they made me do (Coomaraswamy 
1996: 15). 
 
Kum’s experience is utterly distressing. Like many other ianfu, Kum was tricked with the 
promise of a job and wage. For three years she worked in Japan, till she was raped while 
unconscious by a Japanese soldier. Though she cannot remember being raped, she woke up 
bloody, presumably because she was a virgin. Young and new, Kum served high-ranking 
military men. As she grew older and more “used,” Kum served low-ranking soldiers. She and the 
other women underwent medical examinations. Those who were diseased, simply “vanished,” or 
were possibly killed. As if these women were sex toys or mere objects, ianfu were objectified 
and discarded. Dejected with emotional, physical, mental pain, Kum reflects she can no longer 
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have intercourse or eat certain foods. Even some animals receive better treatment than Kum did. 
Kum’s body, mind, and soul are irreparably damaged. 
The next is Chong’s story: 
There were around 400 other Korean young girls with me and we [collectively] had to 
serve over 5,000 Japanese soldiers as sex slaves every day – up to 40 men per day 
[individually]. Each time I protested, they hit me or stuffed rags in my mouth. One held a 
matchstick to my private parts until I obeyed him. One Korean girl caught a venereal 
disease from being raped so often and, as a result, over 50 Japanese soldiers were 
infected. In order to stop the disease from spreading and to “sterilize” the Korean girl, 
they stuck a hot iron bar in her private parts (Coomaraswamy 1996: 13–4). 
 
As if the horror of being raped an average of forty times a day is not already sickening, Chong 
and her associates were tortured and battered. Kum had her dress ripped off with a bayonet while 
Chong was inflicted with pain till she succumbed. Chong’s counterpart was further mutilated. 
Attempting to encapsulate the hardship of ianfu is a near-impossible task. There simply are no 
words that can justly retell the comfort women struggle. 
 The last testimony of this section is Hwang’s. She says, 
 When I was 17 years old, in 1936, the head of our village came to our house and 
promised me to help me find a job in a factory. Because my family was so poor, I gladly 
accepted this offer of a well-paid job. I was taken to the railway station in a Japanese 
truck where 20 or so other Korean girls were already waiting. We were put on the train, 
then onto a truck and after a few days’ travel we reached a big house at the River 
Mudinjian in China. I thought it was the factory, but I realized that there was no factory. 
Each girl was assigned one small room with a straw bag to sleep on, with a number on 
each door. 
 After two days of waiting, without knowing what was happening to me, a Japanese 
soldier in army uniform, wearing a sword, came to my room. He asked me “will you 
obey my words or not?,” then pulled my hair, put me on the floor and asked me to open 
my legs.  He raped me. When he left, I saw there were 20 or 30 more men waiting 
outside.  They all raped me that day. From then on, every night I was assaulted by 15 to 
20 men. 
 We had to undergo medical examinations regularly. Those who were found disease-
stricken were killed and buried in unknown places. One day, a new girl was put in the 
compartment next to me. She tried to resist the men and bit one of them in his arm.  She 
was then taken to the courtyard and in front of all of us, her head was cut off with a 
sword and her body was cut into small pieces (Coomaraswamy 1996: 14–5). 
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According to Kum, Chong, and Hwang, all three women faced relatively similar experiences. 
What is common in most of these ianfu narratives is that ianjo proprietors and recruiters would 
lure young girls with guarantees of work and money. Because many of these girls were daughters 
of poor families, they complied. If girls wanted to leave and return home, they were forcibly held 
against their will. Upon arrival to the comfort stations, ianfu were ushered into barracks 
resembling a series of individual rooms. Though the number of Japanese soldiers tend to vary, it 
seems comfort women were required to serve up to twenty or thirty men a day. All ianfu were 
subjected to medical examinations as well as physical abuse and torture. Chong says girls with 
diseases “vanished” and Hwang reiterates this as well. She says disease-stricken ianfu were 
killed and castoff, they no longer served a purpose to the Government of Japan or its Imperial 
Army. When Hwang’s friend refused to submit, she was brutally killed in front of the other 
ianfu. She was made into a spectacle and example to strike fear and obedience.  
 Nevertheless, more than just female victims of war, ianfu are survivors. Lee Oksun says 
she did not survive the War because she wanted to. She lived because that is how her life 
unfolded. This was true for Kim Hak-sun as well. She also said because she lived, she told her 
ianfu story to the world.  
The Comfort Stations 
 
Ianjo were diverse, and Soh describes three different forms of comfort facilities: 
concessionary, paramilitary, and criminal. Concessionary refers to “commercial houses of 
assignation and prostitution run by civilian concessionaries to make money” (Soh 2008: 117). 
“Contractually regulated,” these comfort women fulfilled functions like sexual services and 
entertainment for military men. Civilian entrepreneurs, Korean and Japanese, usually profited off 
of concessionary establishments. In contrast, paramilitary ianjo “operated as not-for-profit 
	 36	
recreational facilities, run by the paternalistic military to control the troops through regulated 
access to sex” (Soh 2008: 118). These also made a financial profit of sorts, but this was not the 
main aim. Both the concessionary and paramilitary facilities were operated under strict medical 
restrictions to ensure venereal diseases and sex crimes were kept at a minimum. The third 
category, criminal ianjo, enabled sex crimes by Japanese troops against local women 
“employed” as ianfu. These facilities were “run by soldiers . . . in the battlefield [who] confined 
women in enemy territory in sexual enslavement after either rape and abduction or coercive 
procurement” (Soh 2008: 118). According to Soh, the motive behind this facility came from 
soldiers seeking to relieve their sexual needs at will and for free (Soh 2008: 118). 
Concessionary Stations 
The concessionary ianjo is a combination of two subtypes: the House of Entertainment 
and the House of Prostitution. The House of Entertainment originated from Japan’s original 
“pleasure quarters” and were often implicit and masked under the veil of ordinary businesses, 
like lofts, restaurants, etc. These establishments often provided goods, such as food and 
beverages as well as “heterosexual entertainment and prostitution,” for military men and 
personnel, both former and current (Soh 2008: 119). It was a business strictly regulated and 
controlled to ensure both safety and profit. Japanese women were paid 1.5 yen while Korean and 
Chinese were paid 1 yen. As the men visiting the entertainment houses were “most concerned 
with the prevention of venereal disease,” they required the women to undergo weekly medical 
checks (Soh 2008: 119). 
Korean survivor Mun Myung-gum describes her experience in an Entertainment House. 
Mun was recruited as a comfort woman by a Korean man in his fifties (Soh 2008: 120). The 
room assigned to Mun was “simple yet clean” with Japanese style decorations. During the first 
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few days, Mun simply relaxed by the request of her employer. Having come from a rural Korean 
village, she remembers admiring the establishment’s convenient bathroom facilities and clean 
running water. It was not till days later she understood the true nature of her work in the comfort 
station, and by then, it was too late to return home (Soh 2008: 120).  
The House of Prostitution is the second form of concessionary ianjo. Though these 
facilities were organized and owned by civilians, they were closely linked with the State and 
military. The Government of Japan may presently deny such allegations, but there is convincing 
evidence that suggests otherwise. Former military policeman Ichikawa Ichiro claims that 
“military comfort stations were run by civilian entrepreneurs” and that he and other military men 
supervised. This is from Ichiro:  
“I thought vaguely that ianjo was a place where soldiers went to relax and enjoy 
themselves. In addition to the two military ianjo I supervised, there were minkan ianjo 
[private or civilian comfort station] as well as many special restaurants where prostitution 
took place. However, officers also went to military ianjo, since they were cheaper than 
civilian ones” (Soh 2008: 121). 
 
Ichiro’s excerpt suggests that the military shares great responsibility in creating ianjo. The 
soldiers needed a place for relaxation and satisfaction, and as such, ianjo were created.  
Paramilitary Stations 
Soh’s second category of comfort stations is the paramilitary ianjo, further divided into 
two subtypes: The Maiden’s Auxiliary and The Quasi-Brothel. The Auxiliaries were located in 
remote frontline areas where women played a larger role than that of sex slaves. These comfort 
women, in addition to sexually serving men, were also expected to perform a series of feminine 
gender roles, including manual labor. In contrast, the Brothels differed slightly in that the women 
were not required to do manual labor. Both types of paramilitary facilities, as suggested by 
women’s testimonies, were products of human trafficking (Soh 2008: 124). 
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The Maidens’ Division is said to have started around the early 1930s following the 
Manchurian Incident. Local women were recruited to help around with odd jobs and tasks in 
service to the Japanese Army. Similar to the euphemistic term ianfu, the Maidens’ Division was 
referred to as “special platoon” (tokushu shotai), or as “girls’ army.” These comfort women were 
so essential to the Army and State that they were even issued official navy documents required 
for international travels. As Soh explains, comfort women of this kind were known as “nurses as 
tender as wives” who tended to wounded soldiers” (Soh 2008: 145).  
Korean survivor Ch’oe Il-rye worked in this Division. Ch’oe explains she and five other 
girls around her age arrived in Manchuria during the winter season. It was somewhere on a 
battlefront where soldiers had built poor semblances of shelter with plywood and tent material. 
These were the men’s barracks. Off to the side, women had their own establishment surrounded 
by wire fences and male guards. Each woman had her own room. Ch’oe notes that she and the 
other Koreans were given new names. Ch’oe became Haruko, and this was meant to symbolize 
assimilation into Japan’s colonialism (Soh 2008: 126).  
Ianfu in the Maiden’s Division, like Ch’oe, were assigned to tasks like nursing, cleaning, 
and laundering. Ch’oe explained she sent the men off to war and cleaned their wounds when they 
returned. If soldiers died in battle, she would attent the funeral service and pay her respects by 
wearing black hats and kimonos (traditional Japanese attire). In other instances, she took on the 
role of barmaid and served and drank alcohol with the Japanese soldiers. Though there was no 
regular form of payment, she did receive the occasional tip amounting to two to three yen (Soh 
2008: 126). However, much more was required from her than the role of caretaker. To be an 
ianfu is to be a sex slave, and as such, Ch’oe was forced to have sex with soldiers and undergo 
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medical examinations. After her first examination, Ch’oe was summoned by a high-ranking 
officer:  
Until then I had no knowledge about the male sexual organ, let alone about coitus. The 
officer raped me, and I tried to accept everything as my fate. I recall about thirty of us 
women resided scattered across the huge military compound. We gathered together for 
weekly medical examinations on a weekday when we did not serve soldiers (Soh 2008: 
126). 
 
For thirteen years, Ch’oe took care of the Imperial Army by doing a variety of “women’s 
roles.” She remembers life continued to worsen more towards the end of the War when goods 
were scarce and there was too little food. Luckily, Ch’oe was able to escape the War. She 
explains, 
 . . an officer whom I served regularly told me to flee without telling the other women. He 
provided me with three white identification cards and explained to me in detail how to 
run away. I followed his instructions and was able to make it. By the time I arrived in 
Seoul, Korea was liberated. Then I returned to my hometown right away (Soh 2008: 126–
7). 
 
The second arrangement of the paramilitary system is the Quasi-Brothel, and it also 
started around 1938. Kim Hak-sun was located in a Quasi-Brothel. Though parts of her story 
have already been shared, her experience further supplements the comfort women case. After 
arriving to Beijing, Kim was hustled by Japanese soldiers and physically lifted and placed into a 
truck with about forty to fifty other girls. This is the rest of her experience: 
During the journey, when shooting was heard, everyone got off and crouched 
underneath the truck. We were given balls of cooked rice during the ride. At dusk the 
following day we got off the truck and were taken to a house. Later in the evening, the 
officer came to take me to an adjoining room, divided only by a curtain. He forced 
himself upon me. During the night, he raped me again. . . . 
 If we wished to go out [of the ianjo], the sentinel of the military unit located next 
to the house would check us. Each room had bed covered by a blanket and a basic by the 
door. We wore cotton underwear that had been discarded by the soldiers. From time to 
time, they would bring us clothes acquired from abandoned Chinese houses. When the 
soldiers came to the house, they chose the rooms of the women they fancied. As a result, 
each of us had regular customers. They varied in the way they treated us. While some 
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would knock me around [with exhaustion] at the end of the thirty minutes, others would 
be quite gentle. One ordered me to suck his sexual organs while holding my head 
between his legs. Another asked me to wash his sexual organ after intercourse. 
Sometimes when I resisted out of disgust, I would end up being roundly beaten. 
 The women at my place were not furnished with condoms. Instead, soldiers 
brought their own. And once a week, a military doctor from the rear would come with an 
assistant to conduct routine medical check-ups. When he was busy, he would sometimes 
miss a visit. We had no set holidays and had to serve soldiers even during menstrual 
periods. After a month, I began to realize that the same men kept coming back, and that 
there were no new soldiers. Usually, they would come in the afternoon for about half an 
hour, but when they had been out on punitive expeditions, they would return in the early 
hours of the morning, singing as they marched, and we had to be up early to serve them, 
usually at about seven or eight. Soldiers who came in the afternoon would stay for about 
thirty minutes each. When they visited us in the evening, they would often come drunk 
and demand that we entertain them by singing or dancing. 
  After about two months, the military unit moved in a great hurry one morning. 
We were told to ride in the truck with the soldiers. The new place was not too far away, 
but it seemed to be further out in the countryside. We could hear much more shooting 
than in the previous location. The house was smaller, and a fewer soldiers came. The 
military doctor seldom visited the new place. Soldiers went on expeditions more 
frequently than before, and quite few of them brought bottles of alcohol with them when 
they visited us in the morning after such trips. Life seemed more miserable than before, 
and I continued to look for ways to escape as I did before the move. 
 One day a Korean itinerant merchant of about forty years of age managed to 
sneak into my room. Upon confirming that he was a fellow Korean, I appealed to his 
sense of ethnic solidarity, begging him to take me with him. After servicing his sexual 
desire, I desperately pleaded again with the rather reluctant compatriot before I was able 
to flee with him. We became man and wife, and I gave birth to a daughter and son before 
our return to Korea in 1946 (Soh 2008: 128–30). 
 
Unlike the Ch’oe in the Auxiliary, Kim was not required to launder, clean, or nurse. Still, Kim’s 
experience is not so different from other ianfu. She was kept against her will and repeatedly 
raped during her time as a comfort woman.  
Criminal Stations 
 The final form is criminal ianjo. Criminal comfort stations were created on battlefront 
locations in occupied territories, such as the Philippines; however, unlike the two categories 
previously mentioned, this particular organization lacked in health regulations and “hygienic 
considerations” as formerly insisted by military authorities (Soh 2008, 130). What is especially 
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notable about these facilities is that they gained prominence during the last months of World War 
II. Personal accounts suggest that these women were “caught by soldiers and raped in the field 
before being brought to a garrison, where they were forced into sexual slavery” (Soh 2008: 131). 
Twenty-two Filipino women have described their involvement with criminal ianjo. While some 
endured the sexual violence for a few weeks or several months, other women were held for a 
year or more. Most of the women were able to escape in secret or when American forces 
intervened and began bombing Japanese territory (Soh 2008: 131). Like Kim Hak-sun and Lee 
Ok-sun, Filipina survivors are among the litigants demanding honesty from the Japanese 
government. 
Maria Rosa Henson (1927-1997) was Filipina survivor. She, in 1992, was the first 
Filipina to out herself as an ianfu working in a criminal ianjo. Henson explains she “was carrying 
food and medicine to help the Filipino guerrilla movement when a Japanese soldier at a 
checkpoint took her at gunpoint to a comfort station . . . located on the second floor of the 
building that had been the town hospital but had been turned into the ‘Japanese headquarters and 
garrison’” in April 1943 (Soh 2008: 131). In what Henson describes as an “impromptu rape 
camp,” there were six other women living in small rooms with bamboo beds, curtains, and no 
doors. Soldiers stood guard, wielding bayonets and making sure no one escaped. The day 
following, a soldier entered Henson’s room, pointing a weapon to Henson’s chest and 
demanding sex. Henson claims the soldier “used his bayonet to tear her dress open before he 
raped her. When he was finished, other soldiers took turns” raping her as well (Soh 2008: 131). 
Perhaps one way of deciphering Henson’s experience and criminal ianjo is by comparing 
it to another case study. Soh states Henson’s “rape centers” are similar to those witnessed in the 
Bosnian Conflict, “at least on the surface” (Soh 2008: 131). Though the crimes committed during 
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World War II and the Balkan War are fundamentally different, Korean activists and comfort 
women have, in the past, described the comfort women case as a mass execution of women (Soh 
2008: 131; Park 2014). During the Balkan War, the Serbian military and its soldiers committed 
rape as a tool of ethnic cleansing. Women were forcibly impregnated and used as a public 
display to slowly yet effectively eradicate a people from the area. Some rapes were even 
recorded and exposed as “sexual spectacles” for war propaganda as mass consumption (Soh 
2008: 131). The comfort women case, on the other hand, though it has been described as “a 
genocidal act,” was more about the “sexual release and satisfaction” of the Japanese soldiers in a 
time of war (Soh 2008: 131). Japan’s intent was more about sexual fulfillment. 
During the outset of the Manchurian Invasion, comfort stations started as a form of 
entertainment in urban areas and later at remote front lines. These are the concessionary comfort 
stations. After the Rape of Nanking, however, the comfort stations transitioned to paramilitary 
ones. There was an increase of troops and local Japanese resentment increased, demanding a 
more closed, secure form of sexual labor. Finally, towards the end of the war, criminal ianjo 
emerged, embodying “violent military hypermasculine sexuality” (Soh 2008: 134). This depicts 
the complications of the comfort women system. No longer can this case be viewed as a simple 
incident with a simple solution. There were deep, underlying workings of corruption, coercion, 
and domination. Throughout the thirteen years of World War II, the comfort women system 
adapted and evolved to ensure Japan’s soldiers received their release and satisfaction. 
This explains who ianfu were and what they endured in ianjo. Testimonies, like the ones 
used throughout this section, are the same stories shared with the current Japanese State in hopes 
of establishing peace and justice in the comfort women case. 
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The Comfort Women’s Testimonies 
Kim Hak-sun and other survivors have been repeatedly asked why they waited so long to 
testify. Those who are familiar with the consequences and aftermath of rape would not ask such 
an insensitive question. Though rape in war is not unique, the comfort women case is not unique, 
it is special. It is crucial to be considerate and patient when learning and understanding the ianfu 
issue.  It is unfair for anyone, whether it be the Japanese Government or ianfu dissenters, to 
interrogate, chastise, and deny these survivors. Even if there is a point of disagreement, the least 
one can do is listen and simply respect the lives and dignities of the women.  
Still, researchers, like Dr. Yolanda Moses of the University of California, have suggested 
answers as to why ianfu waited so long to testify. In some instances, societies tend to hold men 
to a higher esteem, consequently devaluing women. This is relevant within the comfort women 
context. The intricacies of the Korean history and culture provide some insight as to why 
survivors struggled to come out. Korea, like many other Asian countries, has been and still is for 
the most part intrinsically socially conservative (Fisher 2015). Considered to be “one of the 
leading institutions of modern society,” South Korea adapted in a way that “[brought] about 
women’s self-awakening and subsequent efforts to shake loose the yoke of patriarchy” (Soh 
2008: 4). The twentieth century may have caused great changes for South Korean girls and 
young women in the form of formal education, but conservative notions and ideals remain 
dominant. In a society that is historically and culturally patriarchal and male-controlled, 
education was the channel needed to create female awareness and agency. This form of female 
empowerment came grave political implications.  
Dr. Moses continues that when women victims accuse men of assault, the female 
accusers are sometimes reversibly blamed. The women become the guilty and are “accused of 
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‘ruining’ the man” who is actually at wrong (Miller 2016). This is more than simply assuming 
the aggressor is innocent or that the victim is lying. Rather, there is an underlying notion that the 
victim is at fault and to be blamed for the assault. The “outdated cultural belief that ‘good 
women don’t get raped’” is a pertinent one, continues Miller (Miller 2016). When the victim is 
pressured and blamed, this shifts sides with the perpetrator (Miller 2016). 
Compiled and edited by Keith Howard, True Stories of the Korean Comfort Women 
describes life after the War and Korea’s liberation. Many of the Korean women who survived to 
return home were unable to re-adapt and remained unhappy. One of the women featured is Mun 
Okchu. She recalls being shunned and shamed for her past. 
Nearing the end of her life, Mun speaks, 
I had only been back a short while when my aunt by marriage – my uncle’s wife – 
visited and said they couldn't allow someone like me [an ianfu] to say at home and 
disgrace the family. I was not treated as a human being by my relatives. I was sad and 
upset, but I quickly grew bold, telling them to mind their own business. I didn’t pay much 
attention to what they thought of me. . . . 
But since I have now poured out my life story to you I feel much more easy. I will 
be able to sleep and eat much better. Until last year, . . . I kept China to myself. I was so 
ashamed of what had happened that I did not want to let other people know anything 
about it. So I told people what had happened sparingly. Now that everyone knows the 
story, however, I feel I have nothing to fear. So, now I have told you everything about 
myself, I can rest easily (Howard 1995: 113–4). 
 
Just as Dr. Moses suspected, Mun was treated as if she had committed a wrong. Though her 
relatives did not directly accuse her, they did blame her for something out of Mun’s control. Mun 
lived in concealment, fearing isolation the negative judgments of others. While Mun fortunately 
felt elevated at the end of her testimony, not all comfort women experienced the same relief. 
Some women expressed fear of the consequences of revealing their past, worrying how family 
and friends would perceive (Howard 1995). 
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Dr. Moses continues, “speaking out about an instance of assault can be very painful and 
cause personal embarrassment” (Miller 2016). Testifying, explaining, and sharing an experience 
of sexual assault or violence is an act of verbally, mentally, emotionally reliving the incident. 
The act of reliving may be repeated over and over again when the victim is asked to retell the 
experience to the family and friends, police, juries, etc. This can be especially disturbing if others 
do not believe the victim and instead side with the aggressor. The situation becomes more 
complicated if the “victim is accusing a high-power individual in society, or something who has 
power over [his/her] life” (Miller 2016). Dr. Moses concludes that the “There’s a burden from 
society upon people who speak out” (Miller 2016).  
This is true for Korean survivor Yi Sangok. Also in Howard’s collection of ianfu stories, 
Yi expresses her pains. Though her physical injuries are notable, her emotional and mental 
agonies are grave. Yi says, 
Whenever I think of the events of the past or talk about them, I get headaches and am 
unable to sleep for many nights. Even if I cry aloud, I don’t think I can feel relieved. My 
anger has become a kind of disease. It shoots through me, and even in the depths of 
winter I can only sleep with my door open. The doctor who sees me often tells me I must 
not be upset about my past. . . . These days I feel tired and cannot be bothered to do 
anything (Howard 1995: 133). 
 
The difficulties victims face when “coming out” is unmistakable in the lives and actions of the 
comfort women case. Now, many South Koreans, men and women alike, look back on the first 
half of the twentieth century as a moment of weakness under Japanese colonialism. As evident in 
Mun, Yi, and the other survivors mentioned, shame and fear are relevant in determining whether 
or not victims testify.  
This is also true for Kim Hak-sun. By confronting Japan, surviving comfort women were 
also demanding a formerly forgotten issue to be remembered and brought into the present. Had it 
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not been for Kim, Korean Hwang Kumju never would have shared her own story. For Hwang, 
Kim was a source of power and inspiration: 
As times, I thought of ending my life, for it was too difficult to continue living on my 
own. . . . I wonder how I can live the rest of my life without continually being looked 
down upon and without being ill. 
I have lived my life with a resentful heart. I have wanted to tell my government what I 
have had to suffer, but I haven’t been given the opportunity. In November 1991, at 1.00 
p.m., I watched Kim Haksun tell her story on national television. The following morning, 
I rang the number which had been shown, and met up with her. She showed me how to 
report what had happened to me. 
I left home thinking I was doing my duty as a faithful child. But that action ruined my 
life. From now on, I would like to live the rest of my days without being ignored by 
others. It is my wish to help poo people and eventually to die with being a burden on 
others (Howard 1995: 78–9). 
 
Kim’s testimony was not just a cry for help and recognition, or a personal awakening. By means 
of confronting Japan, surviving comfort women were also demanding a formerly forgotten issue 
to be remembered and brought into the present. But Kim was traumatized beyond repair because 
of the comfort women system.	
International Law and Human Rights 
 In light of the comfort women case, it is important to understand that human rights 
innate. Each person is inherently born with basic rights. Though the comfort women case took 
some time in officially being recognized as a crime against humanity, it still falls purview of 
human rights. The comfort women incident was a widespread and systematic human rights 
violation.  
The United States is also, to an extent, responsible for the lack of ianfu justice. In 1945, 
the allies of the War held and apprehended war crimes to not only “punish those responsible but 
also to force historical accounting, so that the victims might feel [they had] received justice” 
(Fisher 2015). Arguably, this process was relatively successful in the case of Germany, at least in 
	 47	
comparison to that of the ianfu. These war tribunals sought justice and delivered it to the victims. 
In the case of Japan, however, the tribunals were more or less “dominated by Western powers,” 
focusing on Japan’s crimes against the Western people and their interests than against others, 
like Koreans. This is evident in the details of the case. There were eleven judges and only three 
were Asian despite the fact that the majority of aggressors and victims are Asian. It should also 
be noted that none of these three were Korean (Fisher 2015). 
Historian John Dower describes the trial to have been “fundamentally a white man’s 
tribunal” (Fisher 2015; Dower 2000). He continues, “It was especially perverse that no Korean 
served as judge or prosecutor. . . . [Japan’s Asian victims] were not allowed to judge their former 
overlords or to participate in preparing the case against them. The plight of the Koreans was, in 
its way, emblematic of the larger anomaly of victor’s justice as practiced in Tokyo” (Fisher 
2015; Dower 2000). While Germany’s victims had a say and were allowed to partake in the war 
crime investigations, this same courtesy was not extended to Koreans or other comfort victims. 
The comparison goes further: “the German Nazi-era system was completely abolished and Nazis 
themselves banned” (Fisher 2015). They were forced, albeit slowly, to address and acknowledge 
their past wrongs and to admit reconciliation to the point that Adolf Hitler became a “reviled 
figure” in his own country (Fisher 2015). Because Japan was not subject to a similar process, 
Koreans, unfortunately, were robbed of justice and any sense of closure. 
It may be unfair to place the blame solely on the U.S., but they were, at the time and still 
are now, the leading power dominating justice dialogues and negotiations. During the time of the 
War, the American military occupied and was very much involved in Japan. There was a fear 
that, by “abolishing the Japanese government entirely, as [they had] done in Germany,” the 
United States would lose its bearings. Americans had to be careful and act cautiously. It was 
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decided that punishing the Japanese Government and its wartime leaders would harm Americans 
in the region. Historian Herbert Bix explains this had a lasting impact on not only Japan but also 
the greater global world. America’s efforts in preserving Japan figuratively swept the intra-Asia 
conflict under a rug, hiding it from future discussions and progress. Bix says this “had a lasting 
and profoundly distorting impact on Japanese understanding of the lost war” (Fisher 2015; Bix 
2016).  
Perhaps this is why some Japanese politicians, historians, and civilians claim the comfort 
women “were not slaves but rather happy volunteers” (Fisher 2015). It is undeniable that there is 
some misunderstanding of history and distortion of justice (Fisher 2015). The crimes of the 
Japanese State may have happened seventy-five years ago, but there is a reason why these crimes 
feel recent and topical. The crimes against comfort women endure and will continue to do so 
until something has been done. 
With no choice but to, the Government of Japan responded to the ianfu issue. Though 
reluctant, the State issued the Kono Statement in an attempt to acknowledge guilt and past 
wrongdoings. It essentially stated that the former Japanese military was both openly and 
implicitly involved in “the establishment and management of comfort stations and the transfer of 
women” and that “the women were recruited against their own will” to live “in misery at comfort 
stations under a coercive atmosphere” (Soh 2008: 44; Kono 1993). It also established the Asian 
Women’s Fund for survivors (44). However, as if adding fuel to the flame, Japan’s statement and 
the Fund sparked greater controversy and disappointment. Not all of Japan seemed to agree that 
an apology was in order, and comfort women were unsatisfied with the Fund. Donations for the 
Fund came from the Japanese people, not the Government. Though appreciative of Japanese 
donations, ianfu still saw this as the Government’s inability, or reluctance, to sincerely 
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apologize. With Japanese conservatives “condemning [and] disputing Japanese guilt” and 
comfort women rejecting the Fund, there were a strong resistances from both sides (Soh 2008: 
44; Fisher 2015). The current comfort women controversy may stem from past crimes against 
humanity and wartime rape, but it also has to do with Japan’s refusal to apologize to its former 
colonial subjects. Ianfu express that it is their right to receive a confession. 
With no choice but to, the Government of Japan responded to the ianfu issue. Though 
reluctant, the State issued the Kono Statement in an attempt to acknowledge guilt and past 
wrongdoings. It essentially stated that the former Japanese military was both openly and 
implicitly involved in “the establishment and management of comfort stations and the transfer of 
women” and that “the women were recruited against their own will” to live “in misery at comfort 
stations under a coercive atmosphere” (Soh 2008: 44; Kono 1993). It also established the Asian 
Women’s Fund for survivors (44). However, as if adding fuel to the flame, Japan’s statement and 
the Fund sparked greater controversy and disappointment. Not all of Japan seemed to agree that 
an apology was in order, and comfort women were unsatisfied with the Fund. Donations for the 
Fund came from the Japanese people, not the Government. Though appreciative of Japanese 
donations, ianfu still saw this as the Government’s inability, or reluctance, to sincerely 
apologize. With Japanese conservatives “condemning [and] disputing Japanese guilt” and 
comfort women rejecting the Fund, there were a strong resistances from both sides (Soh 2008: 
44; Fisher 2015). The current comfort women controversy may stem from past crimes against 
humanity and wartime rape, but it also has to do with Japan’s refusal to apologize for its former 
colonial subjects. Ianfu express that it is their right to receive a confession.  
The United Nations Report (1996) 
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A few years after the Kono Statement, the United Nations appointed a comfort women 
commission. As the United Nations is reaffirmed in the faith of “fundamental human rights, in 
the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations 
large and small”, its purpose is to essentially establish, among nations, respect and equal rights 
(Claude and Weston 1989: 21). Hopefully, the achieved end goal will be cooperation among and 
respect for all in the international world. Perhaps optimistic or idealistic, the United Nation 
attempts to unite all regardless of race, language, sex, religion, etc. (Claude and Weston 1989: 
21). This particular United Nations Commission will be used to analyze the comfort women case 
as a human rights violation and crime against humanity. As this is after ianfu testimonies and the 
defining of “human rights,” this report provides necessary information in light of international 
law. The United Nations report is basically a compilation of photographs, records of comfort 
station regulations, and the testimonies of sixteen women. Though little documentation exists, 
obtainable records are meticulous and thorough, accurately depicting what the life of an ianfu in 
and ianjo would have been like (Coomaraswamy 1996: 6). Conclusively, this includes the 
definition of “comfort women,” the testimonies of sixteen Korean ianfu, and Japan’s response 
and future responsibilities. It should be noted that some of the women included in the United 
Nations’ report have already been introduced. 
The Commission attempted to thoroughly define “comfort women”, describe the stations’ 
conditions, and assign moral responsibility to the parties involved.  Coomaraswamy, the Special 
Rapporteur, establishes slavery as “‘the status of condition of a person over whom any or all of 
the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised’ in accordance with article 1 (1) of 
the 1926 Slavery Convention (Coomaraswamy 1996: 4). She continues to define the comfort 
women case and its practices: 
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. . .the practice of “comfort women” should be considered a clear case of sexual slavery 
and a slavery-like practice in accordance with the approach adopted by relevant 
international human rights bodies and mechanisms”, and this includes “the sexual 
exploitation of women and other forms of forced labour during wartime, . . .[and] of 
systematic rape, sexual slavery and slavery-like practice during wartime . . . 
These women and girls were employed in a comfort station situated between Shanghai 
and Nanking, operated directly by the army. This station became the prototype for later 
stations and photographs of the station, as well as regulations for the users, are preserved. 
This station’s direct operation by the army did not continue as the norm for comfort 
stations in the more settled environment which followed when the phenomenon became 
more widespread. There were enough private civilians willing to run the stations and to 
see to their internal operation; they were given paramilitary status and rank by the army. 
The army remained responsible for transportation and the general overseeing of the 
stations, and matters such as health and general supervision remained the responsibility 
of the military (Coomaraswamy 1996: 4, 5). 
 
The comfort women case is, as decreed by the United Nations, is a violation of human rights. It 
is important to note that, under international law, Imperial Japan and its Forces are responsible 
for creating a system of sexual slavery that trafficked, raped, and killed women. This includes 
detaining women against their wills, subjecting women to never-ending sexual violence and rape, 
and deteriorating women’s wellbeing and health while in the comfort stations. Ianfu deserve 
“restitution, compensation and rehabilitation of victims” (Coomaraswamy 1996: 4). 
One of sixteen to testify about her first day at the ianjo is Hwang Kumju, previously 
mentioned. She was 73 years old in 1996. Hwang says Japanese soldiers told her there were only 
five simple orders she had to obey in order to live and survive. Hwang repeats what she was 
instructed: “firstly, the order of the Emperor; secondly, the order of the Japanese Government; 
thirdly, the army company she was attached to; fourthly, the subunit within that company and 
finally, his orders as the tenant of the	tent where she was serving him” (Coomaraswamy 1996: 
17). The first three mandates reveal how ianjo and ianfu were linked to the Imperial Government 
and Army. The final two suggest the women were expected to fully comply. 
 Chong Ok Sun, at the age of 74, is another survivor to have shared her story with the 
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United Nations. Chong reveals the abuse she endured during her time as an ianfu. Like Hwang’s, 
part of Chong’s testimony has already been included, but this particular memory is of another 
Korean ianfu stationed with Chong. The friend is not given a name. Annoyed and dejected with 
life as an ianfu, Chong’s friend questioned why she and other girls had to serve so many men a 
day. Relentless, she demanded an answer but was consequently punished and brutally killed:  
To punish her for her questioning, the Japanese company commander Yamamoto ordered 
her to be beaten with a sword.  While we were watching, they took off her clothes, tied 
her legs and hands and rolled her over a board with nails until the nails were covered with 
blood and pieces of her flesh.  In the end, they cut off her head. Another Japanese, 
Yamamoto, told us that “it’s easy to kill you all, easier than killing dogs.”  He also said 
“since those Korean girls are crying because they have not eaten, boil the human flesh 
and make them eat it” (Coomaraswamy 1996: 14). 
The experience of Chong’s companion is not to be generalized to all comfort women; 
however, it should also not be ignored. This individual’s experience is not only one of sexual 
slavery but also of sexual abuse, torture, and murder. Japanese conservatives, such like Prime 
Minister Shinzo	Abe, may claim the system was a voluntary prostitution, but this suggests 
otherwise. This indicates the comfort women institution was sex slavery. Though Chong was 
able to get away and live to share her story, others, like her friend, were not as fortunate 
(Coomaraswamy 1996: 14). 
	 The testimonies of each Korean ianfu describe individual and personal accounts, but, 
holistically, they suggest the similar overall message. Within the comfort women system, ianfu 
were tortured, raped, and murdered. This is further supported by the United Nations; Imperial 
Japan was responsible for severe crimes and today’s Government of Japan is bold enough to 
denies this.	 	
	 Furthermore, the Special Rapporteur consulted Dr. Cho Hung Ok, the doctor responsible 
for caring for former comfort women after the War. Dr. Cho concluded that the survivors, as of 
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1996, were “physically and psychologically generally” weaker because they “endure[d] multiple 
rapes on a daily basis for many years” (Coomaraswamy 1996: 16). He additionally stressed that, 
greater than the physical scarring and damage done on their bodies, the mental pains are of larger 
consequence. Many of these women “suffer[ed] from lack of sleep, nightmares, high blood 
pressures and nervousness” and have been “sterilized since their reproductive organs and urinary 
tracts were affected by sexually transmitted diseases” (Coomaraswamy 1996: 16). Information 
provided by the Doctor further concludes the ianjo was, in fact, an organization of information 
sex slaves. In a regulated and restricted arrangement, comfort women were forced and ordered 
by the Japanese Imperial Army and Government. 
Comfort Women’s Demands	
 It is no wonder, based on the experiences and pains of the ianfu, that they, the surviving 
women, demand some form of compensation. These are the five demands of the Korean comfort 
women in hopes of finding closure and peace: First, the Government of Japan should 
“[a]pologize individually to each of the surviving women for the suffering they have endured” 
(Coomaraswamy 1996: 16). Though former Japanese Prime Minister Murayama did extend an 
apology, this was apparently not sincere as “his statement had not been endorsed by the Japanese 
Diet” (Coomaraswamy 1996: 16). In the past and even more recently, the Japanese Government 
have made several attempts in alleviating World War II tensions, but Korean ianfu and their 
supporters want a genuine confession, not a statement issuing apology in an attempt thwart off 
the women. They have been silenced and forgotten for long enough, and now, the surviving 
comfort women demand a sincere and heartfelt vow. 
 Second, The Government of Japan and the Imperial Army ought to recognize that they 
are the parties responsible for establishing comfort stations and drafting about “200,000 Korean 
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women as military sexual slaves . . . in a systematic and forcible manner” (Coomaraswamy 1996: 
17). Third, this sort of systematic recruitment for the use of sex slavery is “a crime against 
humanity, a gross violation of international humanitarian law, and a crime against peace, as well 
as a crime of slavery, trafficking in persons and of forced prostitution”, and the comfort women 
demand this be recognized (Coomaraswamy 1996: 17). This is especially insightful as it 
circumscribes and defines Japan’s crimes. It is one thing for the women to claim they are victims 
but another thing entirely for an intergovernmental organization to intervene in an attempt to 
settle an issue. Now, the Korean comfort women have an international entity supporting and 
assisting their cause. This report may be focus on Korean women specifically, but these terms 
demands extend beyond to all comfort women. 
 The fourth demand of the comfort women asks the Government of Japan “to accept 
moral and legal responsibility for such crimes” (Coomaraswamy 1996: 17). The final and fifth 
request is that ianfu also be compensated “from governmental resources to the surviving victims” 
(Coomaraswamy 1996: 17). It was additionally suggested that the Government “enact special 
legislation so as also to enable a settlement of individual claims for compensation through civil 
law suits at Japanese municipal courts” (Coomaraswamy 1996: 17). Though a specific amount 
had not yet been determined, the women emphasize that the compensation is more about its 
symbolic significance than monetary value. The Japanese Government has attempted to 
compensate comfort women by creating the Asian Peace and Friendship Fund for Women, but 
this was deemed sufficient or appropriate. This Fund was sponsored by contributions from 
civilians, not the Government. The women perceived the Fund for Women as the Government of 
Japan weaseling out of responsibility for its actions during World War II (Coomaraswamy 1996: 
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17). Coomaraswamy notes that within the realms of international law, seldom do the perpetrators 
face claim blame and responsibility for crimes (Coomaraswamy 1996: 17). 
Japan’s “Legal Responsibilities” 
 The Rapporteur concludes the Commission with two final sections covering the 
“Position of the Government of Japan” and “Moral Responsibilities.” Based on the United 
Nations’ investigation and interviewing of Korean ianfu, it is clear that the Japanese Imperial 
Government and Army have violated international law and human rights and should be held 
accountable for creating, controlling, and regulating ianjo. The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights article 8 declares “everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent 
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by 
law” while the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights article 2 claims  
any person claiming an effective remedy shall have his right thereto determined by 
competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities or by any other competent 
authority provided for by the legal system of the State, so that the right of the individual 
to an effective remedy is an international norm (Coomaraswamy 1996: 26).  
 
As such, the government should take responsibility and act accordingly in respecting the comfort 
women’s requests. These women have the right to demand a remedy by the law. 
 In August 1993, the Japanese State admitted, in the Kono Statement, that “the then 
Japanese military was directly and indirectly involved in the establishment and management of 
comfort stations and the transfer of ‘comfort women’ and further confessed taking part in “the 
recruitment and the transportation of ‘comfort women’ during the Second World War . . . against 
the will of the women” (Kono 1993; Coomaraswamy 1996: 22). It was concluded that “that this 
[the comfort women system] was an act that severely injured the honor and dignity of many 
women” (Kono 1993; Coomaraswamy 1996: 22). Nevertheless, during her visit to Japan, the 
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Rapporteur provided the Government with documented arguments made by the comfort women 
and records collected by the international community, and it was Japan’s response that, though it 
has a “moral obligations”, it is “under no legal compulsion towards the victims” 
(Coomaraswamy 1996: 22). The Special Rapporteur believes otherwise; in the case of the 
comfort women, Japan has both legal and moral obligations towards comfort women for their 
organizing and of military sexual slavery.   
 This is further supported by other international conventions and treaties. For example, 
the Fourth Geneva Convention further reiterates the topic of wartime rape. Rape during a time of 
war is determined an international war crime. Article 27 explicitly states “women shall be 
especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced 
prostitution, or any form of indecent assault” (Coomaraswamy 1996: 23). Additionally, article 5 
of the Charter of the Tokyo Tribunal and article 6 of the Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal identify “murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts 
committed against any civilian population before or during the war” as crimes against humanity” 
(Coomaraswamy 1996: 23). The sufferings endured by ianfu fit the criteria.  
 From a legal standpoint, the Government of Japan is not technically wrong to deny 
legal responsibility. During World War II and the years immediately following, there was no set 
definition of “human rights,” and, as noted in the 1949 Geneva Convention, there were no 
definitive international laws or instruments deeming Imperial Japan’s actions as crimes against 
humanity. These simply did not exist at the time and, thereby, “the Government was not 
responsible for violating international humanitarian law” (Coomaraswamy 1996: 23). This was 
and still is the ongoing argument from the Government of Japan to this day. This is what Prime 
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Minister Abe declares in response to the comfort women case, and it is evident in his 
conservative opinions and policies.  
 Perhaps another way to better understand this enduring issue is to compare it to the 
former Yugoslavia and its corresponding International Criminal Tribunal. The report of the 
Secretary-General claims that  
. . . the application of the principle nullum crime sine lege requires that the international 
tribunal should apply rules of international humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt 
part of customary law so that the problem of adherence of some but not all States to 
specific conventions does not arise. . . . 
The part of conventional international humanitarian law which has beyond doubt become 
part of international customary law is the law applicable in armed conflict as embodied in 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims:  the 
Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and the 
Regulations annexed thereto of 18 October 1907; the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948; and the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal of 8 August 1945 (Coomaraswamy 1996: 23). 
 
There are certain actions and crimes that do not require a customary international law or court to 
be deemed a crime against humanity or a violation of humanitarian law. It is similar to common 
sense. A law, decree, or norm is not required to define what is and is not considered a crime 
infringing on an individual’s basic wellbeing and essential rights. It should be obvious that 
human trafficking, sexual slavery, and rape are violations of basic human rights. As such, it is the 
belief of the Rapporteur “that States may be held responsible for the violation of these 
international humanitarian law principles even though they were not signatories to the particular 
convention” (Coomaraswamy 1996: 23). 
 It is unlikely that the Government of Japan will accept moral obligation but not legal 
responsibility. Within international law and the comfort women case, both the obligation and 
responsibility are more or less similar in that accepting blame is the “right” thing to do. Still, the 
Japanese State continues to claim it is not responsible. The Special Rapporteur sees the Japanese 
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State claiming moral obligation for its World War II crimes as a “welcome beginning”, and 
perhaps this is true. Though it remains shocking that Japan, despite the testimonies, official 
records and international commissions, would still refute the comfort women case, it seems 
promising that Japan accepts some obligation. These are some ways of compensating surviving 
victims, as suggested by the United Nations:  
“(a) Raising of funds from the private sector as a means to enact the Japanese people’s 
"atonement" for the suffering of former wartime sexual slaves;  
(b) Supporting projects in the field of medical care and welfare in support of former 
"comfort women" victims from governmental and other sources;  
(c) Through the implementation of the Fund’s projects, the Government would express its 
feelings of remorse and sincere apology to all former "comfort women" victims;  
(d) Collating historical documents on the "comfort women" establishment in order "to 
serve as a lesson of history". The Special Rapporteur learned that these and other 
documents relating to modern Asian history will be exhibited publicly in a proposed 
Centre for Modern Japan-Asia Relations;  
(e) Support projects by non-governmental organizations in the Asian region and, in 
particular, in countries from which "comfort women" victims were drawn, in the field of 
the elimination of contemporary forms of violence against women, such as trafficking 
and prostitution” (Coomaraswamy 1996: 30). 
As of 1996, the future of the comfort women case seemed slightly optimistic. Though Japan still 
refused to believe the surviving women and accept past wrongs, there seemed hope for a 
reconciliation in the future. 
The Comfort Women Today 
This optimism, however, was short-lived. In 2012, Prime Minister Abe rejected the 
comfort women and their stories, declaring the claims to have been “overblown” (Fisher 2015). 
He passed a resolution appealing that “there was no official proof the women had been coerced 
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at all” (Fisher 2015). Likewise, Tomoko Tsujimura, “a Tokyo assembly member and a member 
of a ‘Japan Coalition of Legislators Against Fabricated History,” released a statement in 2007 
asserting, “I was convinced that the comfort women issue was completely fabricated by the 
South Koreans” (Sekiguchi 2014). She has also said at a news conference for foreign press that 
“she ‘felt happy thinking of the good deeds we’ve [the Japanese people and State] done to the 
Korean people’ during Japan’s colonialization, including ‘improving the circumstances for 
Korean women to raise children ‘because the population doubled during Japanese rule’” 
(Sekiguchi 2014). 
 In 1945, when the War ended and Japan surrendered, the Japanese Army and 
Government attempted to destroy official documents and records. This explains why so little is 
known about the comfort women and the comfort stations. Still, the women’s stories and 
experiences provide plenty of evidence. Despite Prime Minister Abe and his seemingly 
unjustified resolution, there have also been Japanese activists supporting and legitimizing the 
comfort women case. 
 The present-day controversy surrounding comfort women remain as contested and 
complicated as it was in 1991 when Kim Hak-sun spoke first. Extending far beyond the World 
War II and sexual slavery, the comfort women case has been and still is a grim political and 
social issue (Fisher 2015). Comfort women and their supporters demand that the Japanese 
Government take responsibility for its former crimes against humanity. Though there has been 
and still is a large-scale, international campaign, including mass demonstrations and protests in 
Korea and Taiwan, the Japanese State and its prime ministers throughout the years have only 
done the bare minimum to appeal and thwart off criticism. Japan may have offered its 
“profound” apologies and small funds to help surviving ianfu, but they are reluctant in their 
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actions and insincere in their apologies. As if a child being disciplined begrudgingly accepts his 
punishment, the Government of Japan likewise bitterly attempts to appease comfort women.  
 The comfort women case is one of darkness and secrecy. These women have been 
silenced and erased from history. Maybe it was the guilt of sexual abuse or the shame of coercing 
and manipulating, but the Government of Japan has essentially removed comfort women from 
the War, history, and the realms of international law. There are many historical records, 
documents, and literature from both during and after World War II, but there is “no mention . . . 
of the comfort women” (Goldstein 2001: 346). Even Japanese history books and textbooks have 
silenced a large portion of World War II happenings and all of the comfort women story. The 
Korean Government, soldiers of the Japanese Imperial Forces, or maybe even invading US 
soldiers all could have brought the comfort women case to attention, but all failed (Kang 2012; 
Goldstein 2001: 346).  
 As of 2015, Korean ianfu were still attempting to negotiate with the Government of 
Japan. Arirang News, an international network in Seoul, South Korea, broadcasted a segment 
titled “‘Comfort Women’ Disappointed by Korea-Japan Resolution: House of Sharing” detailing 
the situation. It begins by explaining, “No one has been hoping more for a fair deal than the 
Korean women victimized by Japan’s wartime atrocities, but their [the Japanese Government’s] 
response to today’s bilateral talks could be described as lukewarm at best” (Kim 2015). Then, 
reporter Ji-young Kim continues, the 
[c]urrent Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had previously wanted to revise the 
statement made by then Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono was based on the accounts 
of 16 Korean women who were victims of Japan's wartime atrocities. 
The House of Sharing also said that Japan's offer to provide reparations as part of an aid 
project but not as direct compensation is redundant since there's already a fund set up by 
the Korean government to help assist the victims. 
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The organization plans to discuss the results of the deal with other local "comfort 
women" groups to coordinate a response by Tuesday. 
It also plans to nullify the deal and demand the Korean government to come up with a 
better settlement that will clearly address Japan's legal responsibility on the sexual 
enslavement issue (Kim 2015). 
 
Imperial Japan’s crimes against ianfu, Korean and others, have never been fully resolved. Each 
time there seems to be progress, Japan shifts its stance and backtracks. This is especially evident 
with each passing Japanese Prime Minister. The few ianfu still alive today desperately ask the 
Government of Japan to finally and sincerely apologize.  
 The Imperial Government of Japan, along with various Korean institutions of the time, 
systematically controlled the girls and young women. Still, to this day, ianfu are denied their 
rights and truths. As if prolonging past abuses, the “metaphor for Korea’s . . . national 
victimhood” remains (Fisher 2015). The South Korean government remains complacent while 
the Government of Japan twists international laws and norms to avoid addressing the comfort 
women case. More than the war crimes and crimes against humanity of World War II, the ianfu 
movement is an international one about how wartime rape victims were silenced and pushed 
aside.   
In 2015, Japan and South Korea together drafted and released a statement concerning the 
comfort women case. In this statement, the Government acknowledges that the previous Kono 
Statement failed to recognize their past crimes against humanity and human rights violations. It 
goes on to acknowledge that Japan’s past attempts in compensating (for example, the Asia 
Women’s Fund previously mentioned) were insufficient. Japan’s statement reassures the 
Government will “refrain from accusing or criticizing each other regarded in the issue in the 
international community, including the United Nations” (Haggard 2015). In response, South 
Korea also acknowledges Japan’s attempts to alleviate the situation and hopes to work with the 
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Government of Japan in also refraining for accusations and criticisms (Haggard 2015). 
 In the following year of 2016, South Korea established the Reconciliation and Healing 
Foundation while Japan paid South Korea 10 billion yen, about 9 million US dollars, as an 
invitation to building a more cooperative future relationship. Japan has made it clear this money 
is given on “humanitarian grounds” (Kwon 2016). This, however, is complicated. Surviving 
victims are to get 90 thousand US dollars each while families of the deceased will get 18 
thousand. Surviving women want a “concrete compensation”, or for the Government of Japan to 
take “clear legal responsibility to its past wrongdoings” (Kwon 2016). They are still waiting for 
the Government to “restore the honor and dignity of all surviving victims of the wartime sex 
slavery in Korea” (Kwon 2016).  
 This takes me back to my time with Lee Oksun. Lee tells me she does not have long to 
live but hopes to receive an apology from Japan before dying. Slightly chagrin, she says this 
unlikely to happen (Lee). Still, Lee says chooses to remain optimistic about the future and what 
is to come. She concludes with this parting message:  
We [ianfu] don't hate Japanese, but it is the Japanese government that is bad. Students 
need to become great people to create a world without war and with peace. We suffered 
because we didn’t know better, but now we do. We [all] have to make sure this doesn’t 
happen again. Hardships are not simply a thing of the past. Especially women need to 
know this (Lee). 
Surviving victims may die without getting the official apology they desperately desire and 
deserve. It is also likely that similar crimes against humanity will happen again and continue to 
occur in the future. Still, I would like to believe that these women have changed the face of 
international law for the better. These brave women created a movement that forced the 
Government of Japan and the greater, global world to listen. Lee’s finishing statement is 
empowering, and I hope readers take it to heart. 
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